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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to assess the post-IPO performance structures of
young entrepreneurial firms. Based on the propositions of the signaling model, I propose
that the firm IPO performance is a determining factor in post-IPO changes in ownership
structures. Furthermore, I contend that the new owners that replace the original ones in
young IPO firms will be prone to request changes in corporate governance mechanisms
such as top management team membership and the boards of directors based on the need
to have their own agents looking after their interests as recommended by the agency
theory. Following these alterations in corporate governance mechanisms, I propose such
changes will be detrimental for the performance of the young entrepreneurial firms as
these firms, due to their uniqueness, are still in great need of the tacit knowledge
provided by their original decision makers. Finally, moderating effects of the
environmental dimensions of dynamism, complexity and munificence are hypothesized to
impact the relationship between the rate of change on corporate governance mechanisms
and firm performance.
In the literature review section I review studies that explore why firms go public,
the main areas of IPO research, the importance of executives and directors in young
entrepreneurial firms, the theories related to IPO performance and its measures, the
uniqueness of these firms and the potential impact of environment on decision making
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routines. I develop a model that explains the interrelated relationships I propose to be
present and the corresponding hypotheses. Using the SDC database, I identified 185
young entrepreneurial firms that went public in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Based
on the previous literature, the criterion I used for being a young entrepreneurial firm was
the founding date. Firms that were founded in 1991 and forward were included in this
study. Using the Edgar Database, Compustat Research Insight, CRSP, Disclosures, and
the company websites, I compiled a database that consists of stock performance,
operating performance, and the governance data for these companies for the five years
following their IPOs.
The results revealed that one of the IPO performance measures, underpricing,
impacts subsequent changes in blockholder ownership in young entrepreneurial firms.
Following the changes in ownership structure, the new owners tend to request changes in
one of the corporate governance mechanisms I considered, boards of directors, but not
top management teams (TMT). I also observed a negative impact for changes in boards
of directors on subsequent firm performance when accounting-based measures are
considered; this was not the case with TMTs. Furthermore, the results also showed that
two of the environmental dimensions exacerbated the relationship between the changes in
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. These results implied that
young entrepreneurial firms operating in complex and less munificent environments are
in more need of the inputs provided by their original directors. The study ends with a
discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of the findings together with the
specification of possible future extensions and limitations.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the most critical steps in a firm's
developmental process (Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003). With that in mind,
researchers acknowledge the fact that most of the issues related to the IPO process a firm
goes through are still not fully understood (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). The impact of
the subsequent changes in corporate governance systems on firm performance during the
post-IPO stage remains an area that warrants attention (Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes,
2009). Jain and Kini (1994) contend that changes in corporate governance mechanisms of
a firm following the IPO process have a direct impact on the operating performance of
that firm. In a more recent article Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) propose that, corporate
governance mechanisms that may be effective for large, well-established firms may not
be appropriate for younger firms that just underwent an IPO. They in effect question the
applicability of classical agency theory contentions for firms that just completed the IPO
process.
Certo et al. (2009) mention the tremendous growth in IPO activity in the last
decade relative to the one before. According to those authors, close to 3,000 IPOs took
place between 1998 and 2007 resulting in over $600 billion in capital being raised.
Research also shows that the majority of these firms are not large companies and are

1

2

likely to face different agency prescriptions then large, well established organizations
(Kroll et al., 2007). These young firms face what scholars refer to as the liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) in the first years of the post-IPO period and may require
relatively different approaches when compared to large corporations (Fama & Jensen,
1983). In that regard, it is the intention of this study to investigate the series of
interrelated corporate governance steps young entrepreneurial firms go through following
the IPO process. In short, this dissertation aims to explain some of the unknowns
resulting from the impact of changes in ownership structure on corporate governance
mechanisms such as board composition and TMT structure and consequent operating
performance changes together with the potential moderating effect of environment on
young entrepreneurial firms.1

Motivation of the Study and Brief Description
of Proposed Relationships
As previous research demonstrates, most of the firms that go public are often
small young firms (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Young firms that go public within a
few years of their original founding date are at a vulnerable point of their developmental
processes (Kroll et al., 2007). Decision makers in such companies have to face many
challenges regarding the transition from private ownership to public ownership, which
includes dealing with regulatory bodies such as Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and meeting the expectations of potential investors (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).
Investors consider every IPO firm as a new investing opportunity. One obvious reason for
this interest is that the share prices of IPO firms, on average, tend to increase on the first
As Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) suggest, young entrepreneurial firms are the ones that are founded within
the ten-year period prior to going public for the first time.
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day of trading as the initial offer price set by the underwriter is too low (Certo el al.,
2009; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Thus, it is common to earn high returns on the first day
of trading of an IPO. Underpricing is formally defined as the difference between a firm's
IPO issue price and its first day closing price (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson,
2008). If the firm is underpriced relative to the value the market places on the shares,
which is referred to as underpricing (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007), the initial investors
who bought shares at the price offered by the underwriter will be rewarded as their
investment has just appreciated in value, although the management has just left money on
the table in the form of lost equity capital that could have been captured by the firm
(Ritter, 1991).
While the finance literature primarily concentrates on the initial fluctuations of
IPO stock prices (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Aggarwal, 2000; Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001),
this study considers these fluctuations as the starting point for a series of relationships.
One of the issues that may be of interest in the post-IPO context is: what happens to firm
ownership structure after the IPO? Goergen & Renneboog (2007) report that, in the
United Kingdom, on average, old pre-IPO shareholders hold 62.8 percent of the shares
immediately after the IPO. That percentage goes down to 51.4, 47.3, 37.7, 33.6 and 31.4
percentages after one, two, three, four and five years respectively. In another article,
Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) report that, once the IPO is completed, firms face
continuous changes in their shareholding compositions. For instance, they report that
inside ownership falls by over 50 percent after the IPO and keeps falling during the
following five years. Adapting a signaling theory perspective (Certo, 2003), finance
literature considers initial IPO performance (i.e. underpricing) as a signaling device for
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firm quality such that underpriced IPO firms signal more promising future results to
potential investors. Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that, original
shareholders of IPO firms maybe more willing to transfer shares of stock to outside
investors after the IPO for personal income (Welch, 1989). It is proposed that, large first
day stock price appreciation following an IPO will attract investors to acquire shares in
the company. In other words, once the IPO process signals a potentially promising future
for the company, investors will step in to acquire these appealing shares. Some of these
investors may be doing this for short-term investment reasons such as quick-entry-andexit type institutional investors, which do not tend to play an active role in firm corporate
governance systems, but others such as buy-and-hold type investors may be more willing
to intervene in the governance of the firms. This dissertation proposes that once investors
become interested in these companies, some of these investors will acquire blockholder
ownership in order to have sufficient power to influence the governance of the focal firm.
In a well-established large corporation, such an intervention may not be considered a
major threat, while in young entrepreneurial firms, a dramatic change in corporate
governance systems may lead to some detrimental effects (Kroll et al., 2007). For this
reason, these young entrepreneurial firms may constitute a unique field for corporate
governance research. Thus, the focus of this study will be on young entrepreneurial firms
that just completed the IPO process.
The changes in ownership structure will also probably lead to changes in firm
TMT structure and board composition. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that directors
derive their power from the shareholders. Powerful shareholders like to appoint their own
agents as directors to the board of a company in which they have some level of control.
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For the purpose of this dissertation, shareholders with blockholder ownership, which
corresponds to at least 5 percent ownership in the focal firm (Kroll, Wright, Toombs, &
Leavell, 1997) are considered to be powerful enough to make appointments to the board
of directors or the executive team. Once the IPO process is completed and firm IPO
performance has acted as a signaling mechanism, the post-IPO investors who bought
shares in the company are likely to ask for changes in board composition by appointing
their directors and asking for changes in TMT structure by appointing their own
executives, which is also anticipated by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Among the long-time agency prescriptions for mitigating the agency problem between
the executives and the owners is effective monitoring by directors (Booth & Deli, 1996).
Instead of relying on oversight by people whom the new investors do not know, newly
appointed directors may look after the new shareholders' interests. Thus, the changes in
ownership structure after the IPO are likely to lead to changes in board composition. One
study reports that, on average, outside representation on the board jumps from less than
50 percent to 67 percent during the five years following the IPO (Curtchly, Garner, &
Marshall, 2002). As the SEC requires companies to have at least 50 percent of the
directors to be independent directors prior to IPO (Certo et al., 2001), this significant
jump in outside representation may be attributed to changes in ownership structure as the
new owners, particularly the ones that bought the shares of the firms they consider
potentially successful of the future, will appoint directors to the board to look after their
interests.
The same logic may also apply to changes in TMT structure. If an active
shareholder is interested in appointing his or her own directors to the board, he or she will
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not be reluctant to appoint his or her own executives given the chance. The board and
executives are two important components of the strategic decision making apparatus
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Unlike privately owned firms, publicly traded firms
are required to get board approval for strategic decisions (Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich,
2000). So, changes in ownership structure should not only be associated with changes in
board structure but also with changes in TMT composition. There is empirical evidence
suggesting that, following an IPO, companies may expect to see changes in their TMT
structure (Wasserman, 2003). One of the fundamental duties of a board is to select and
hire new members of the top management team (Fama & Jensen, 1983). If we expect
changes in board composition, corresponding changes in TMT structure should also be
expected. Based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the directors appointed by
the new owners should be more willing to hire executives who are likely to act in concert
with the new owners. In other words, changes in ownership structure in potentially
promising young entrepreneurial firms not only should lead to changes in board
composition but also to changes in TMT structure as well.
In summary, based on signaling theory (Certo, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004),
promising companies will attract investors following an IPO, and those new owners may
be willing to interfere with two of the most important corporate governance mechanisms:
board composition and TMT structure as they will be looking for agents to look after
their interests given agency theory concerns regarding managerial abuse (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The question at that point becomes: "what happens to the operating
performance of these firms?" The answer to this question represents the final part of a
series of relationships this dissertation proposes to investigate.
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As mentioned previously, firms go through radical changes in their corporate
governance mechanisms following the IPO process (Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997;
Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 2000; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). While some researchers
may associate changes like more outside representation on the board with positive
operating performance based on vigilance requirements of agency theory (Booth & Deli,
1996), recent research demonstrates that such changes may not be appropriate for young
entrepreneurial firms' subsequent firm performance after all (Kroll et al., 2007; Walters,
Kroll & Wright, 2010). There is empirical evidence showing that radical post-IPO
corporate governance changes have negative effects on firm performance (Daily &
Dalton, 1995; Bergh, 2001). If changes in ownership structure following a successful IPO
yields changes in board composition and TMT structure, then these changes may actually
lead to lower subsequent operating performance. Once the original structure of the young
firm is changed, the entrepreneurial efficacy of the company may decline and the firm
may start to perform relatively worse as it is still in need of the knowledge-base provided
by the original TMT and board members to deal with the vulnerabilities of the liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). The original decision makers, who carried the firm
towards the IPO stage, may be likely to act more in line with the propositions of
stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Firms at this critical stage of their lifecycle are still in need of the knowledge base provided by the original TMT members and
directors (Kroll et al., 2007), a point which may also be supported by the contentions of
Resource Based View (Barney, 1991). This dissertation aims to investigate if this is
really the case. If this proposition is verified, the implications of such a finding may be
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important for corporate governance research, young entrepreneurial firms and potential
investors in such firms.
In addition to the above mentioned relationships between changes in corporate
governance mechanisms and firm performance, moderating effects of environmental
factors are also proposed. Dess and Beard (1984) talk about three dimensions of
environment. First, dynamism is the extent to which the firm's environment is turbulent.
Complexity refers to the number of factors in the environment that have the capacity to
influence how the firm operates. Munificence on the other hand is the extent to which the
environment can support sustained growth (Starbuck, 1976). Recent work in the
environment literature contends that firms have to use internal mechanisms to deal with
the external complexities of the environments they operate in (Brown & Eisenhardt,
1997; Walters & Buhian, 2004). According to the model in this study, once such internal
mechanisms, like the presence of original TMT members of young entrepreneurial firms
with working knowledge of how to deal with the external environment, are deactivated
firm performance suffers. In that regard, if the environment is complex, dynamic or less
munificent, the relationship between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and
lower firm performance may become stronger. The environment is known to have an
impact on structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and strategy (Miller, 1988). The
environment's impact on executive decision making, strategy formulation and its
outcomes is substantiated by previous research (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Grag, Walters, &
Priem, 2003). For this reason, environmental factors are considered to moderate the
relationship between TMT structure and board composition variables and firm operating
performance of young entrepreneurial firms.
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The Need for Future Research
As Cohen and Dean (2005) observe, an IPO can be characterized as involving
significant information asymmetry between the potential investors and current owners.
Current insiders of the firm, such as the original executives and board members, possess
considerable amounts of knowledge about the company while the potential investors have
to act on the limited information they can access (Leland & Pyle, 1977). In that regard,
potential investors, either during the pre- or post-IPO stages, have to act upon the signals
to which they are exposed (Certo, 2003). As previously mentioned, while the finance
literature is primarily concerned with stock price fluctuations (Beatty & Ritter, 1986;
Aggarwal, 2000; Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001), the impact of post IPO changes in the
corporate governance structures of recently completed IPOs still remains an area that
needs attention (Certo et al., 2009). Thus, research from a strategy perspective may
contribute to the literature. In order to understand this stage more clearly, it is logical to
start with the reasons that trigger these changes. For that reason, the change in ownership
structure following an IPO, particularly for a young entrepreneurial firm, can be
considered as the initial trigger. Based on signaling theory (Certo, 2003), underpriced
IPOs which can be considered potentially promising investing opportunities, are likely to
encourage investors to acquire shares in a young entrepreneurial company that just
recently completed the IPO process. The real importance of these changes in ownership
structure is related with how these new owners act after acquiring shares in the company.
Will they be more likely to stay inactive and rely on the decisions of the original
executives and directors who successfully brought the firm this far, or will they be more
inclined to appoint their own agents such as new executives and directors based on
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agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Booth & Deli, 1996)? The answer to these
questions obviously falls within the boundaries of corporate governance research.
Furthermore, with regard to the new investors that choose to be active and appoint
their own agents, what happens to the performance of the firm that is probably still in
need of the entrepreneurial efficacy provided by the original insiders based on the
resource based view (Barney, 1991)? Recent research demonstrated that, classical
explanations like agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may not be appropriate for
young entrepreneurial firms because of this need (Kroll et al., 2007). So, this area
obviously needs attention. Besides, as most of the firms that go public are small
entrepreneurial firms rather than large, well-established ones (Certo et al., 2001),
focusing on the evolution of governance in these types of firms should have both
theoretical and practical implications. The literature is not very rich with regard to the
potential impact of corporate governance changes on operating performance of these
young firms, future research is definitely warranted. Finally, although seminal literature
in the field highlights the importance of environment in decision making (Burns &
Stalker, 1961; Dess & Beard, 1984), its potential moderating effect on the relationship
between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm operating performance,
particularly for young entrepreneurial firms, certainly needs attention (Walters et al.,
2010). What happens to the operating performance of such a firm that takes on new TMT
members when it operates in a turbulent environment? Does the firm need even more of
the entrepreneurial efficacy provided by the original TMT members? The answers to
these questions will shed some light on the too many unknowns of the relationship
between the environment and corporate governance research.
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In short, using the model depicted in Figure 1.1, this study aims to demonstrate
the detrimental effects of interfering with original entrepreneurial efficacy of young firms
that just completed the IPO stage. As the proposed relationships are explored with an
extensive literature review and through empirical analysis, the findings may enlighten the
readers about whether to intervene in corporate governance mechanisms of young
entrepreneurial firms.

Changes in TMT
structure
Complexity

(rate of change in
TMT membership)

IPO underpricing of
young
entreprenurial
firms

Changes in Ownership
Fiim performance

Structure
(Blockholder ownership)

Changes m Board

Dynamism

Munificence

Composition
(rate of change in
Board membership)

Figure 1.1 Model of the Series of Relationships Reflecting the Changes in Post IPO
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corresponding Firm Performance.

Statement of Problem and Objectives of the Study
In this dissertation, the purpose is to address the gaps mentioned in the previous
section. In particular, the primary purpose is to investigate the series of relationships and
the subsequent environmental moderating variables depicted in Figure 1.1. The specific
objectives of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
1- To examine whether IPOs of young entrepreneurial firms attract potential
investors to acquire blockholder ownership during the post-IPO period.
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2- To examine whether potential investors that acquire controlling shares in the
focal firm request changes in TMT structure and board composition.
3- To examine whether the appointment of new executives and directors impacts
the entrepreneurial efficacy that brought the firm to the IPO stage.
4- To examine whether the changes in TMT composition have detrimental
effects on subsequent firm operating performance.
5- To examine whether the changes in board structure have detrimental effects
on subsequent firm operating performance.
6- To examine whether environmental factors like dynamism, turbulence and
munificence have a moderating impact on the relationship between changes in
TMT composition and subsequent firm operating performance.
7- To examine whether environmental factors like dynamism, turbulence and
munificence have a moderating impact on the relationship between changes in
board structure and subsequent firm operating performance.
8- To examine whether or not young entrepreneurial firms' corporate governance
mechanisms should be interfered with.
9- To contribute to the explanation of post-IPO performance.
10- To contribute to the literature on the relationship between pre- and post-IPO
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.
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Contributions of the Study
Through the examination of the proposed series of relationships and related
environmental variables as moderators, this dissertation promises a number of
contributions and implications, from both theoretical and practitioner perspectives. First,
it will provide some answers to the long-term debated about whether signaling model
holds for young entrepreneurial firms. Also, it is likely to provide an answer to the
question: "Should the new owners interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms
of young entrepreneurial firms?" An answer to this question will shed light on the debate
about the classical contentions of agency theory. Second, based on the resource based
view, should young entrepreneurial firms hang on to their original executives and
directors who were successful in bringing the firm to the IPO stage? The answer to this
question will enlighten the practitioners about whom to appoint and whom not to appoint.
This answer also extends the work of Kroll et al. (2007) by bringing in the direct and
indirect impact of changes in ownership structure on subsequent changes in corporate
governance mechanisms and their effect on post-IPO operating performance. There is a
debate present in the literature about the impact of boards of directors from a strategic
decision making perspective. If the results show that the changes in board structures of
young entrepreneurial firms result in lower performance, then a significant contribution
to this debate can also be made. Third, although environment is a popular variable to
consider in executive decision making in corporate governance literature, not a lot has
been done within the context of young entrepreneurial firms and particularly the ones that
just completed the IPO process. While Walters et al. (2010) investigated whether a
moderating effect exists between TMT board membership and firm performance, in this
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dissertation, the rate of change in TMT and board membership sourcing from changes in
ownership structure after the IPO is taken into account, and an operating performance
perspective over five-year period rather than a stock market based performance is
considered (Walters and his colleagues used holding period returns over two years as
their dependent variable). Finally, this dissertation is also likely to contribute to the
entrepreneurship literature as researchers call for more empirical research in the area.
While the finance literature has primarily concentrated on pre- and post-IPO stock price
movements, the insights provided in this dissertation are likely to shed light on some of
the many unknowns of the corporate governance literature.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
Why Firms Go Public
Companies need financial resources to facilitate their growth and expansion.
Some companies may only rely on the cash offered by their owners while others choose
to gather this important resource from the external environment. Still others may have
venture capitalists or angel investors financing their growth. Those that decide to go to
external sources may either approach bankers for a credit line or may choose to sell
shares to the public. An Initial Public Offering (IPO) enables a company to sell its equity
to outside investors (Certo et al., 2009). As Daily, Certo and Dalton (2005:94) observe,
"An IPO is one of the more critical junctures in the development of a firm." It is at this
stage that new stakeholders, such as the post-IPO owners, governing bodies such as
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other potential investors are introduced
to the routines of the company.
What motivates companies to go public? As the decision to go public is complex,
it cannot be explained by a single literature stream (Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, 1998).
Brau and Fawcett (2006) provide an excellent review of the different perspectives about
the factors that motivate companies to go public. One group of scholars considers the cost
of capital as the main reason behind the decision to go public. According to this view,
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instead of using internal equity and debt financing, selling equity to external parties may
lower the overall cost of capital, which in turn results in value maximization of the firm
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Mysers & Majluf, 1984; Mysers, 1984). Another group
argues that an IPO is the point at which the insiders cash out their long-term efforts of
bringing the company successfully to this critical stage (Mello & Parsons, 2000; Ang &
Brau, 2003). Thus, if the IPO turns out to be a successful, which obviously is the
intention of the insiders, the founders experience significant personal gain. The third
literature stream is concerned with the subsequent acquisition of the firm following an
IPO. The researchers in this stream consider an IPO as the first step in establishing a true
valuation of the firm, which in turn may lead to the acquisition of the firm in the ensuing
years following an IPO (Brau, Francis & Kohers, 2003). Finally, the fourth group
considers an IPO as a strategic move. Following an IPO, the ownership structure of the
firm gets dispersed (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999), the publicity and reputation of the
firm will be enhanced (Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001) and the activities of the firm will
receive more attention (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003).
Arguably, the two most influential scholars in the area, Jain and Kini (1999:1281)
also review the related literature concerning the reasons why firms go public:
"Conventional wisdom suggests that the public offering represents a stage in the growth
phase of a corporation and, therefore, all private firms with growth prospects eventually
go public to finance investments." One explanation Jain and Kani discuss is financing
expansion. According to this view, companies have to go public when the owners do not
have enough money to support expansion and need external financing to keep moving
forward (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson, Partch & Shah, 1997). One other explanation
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discussed is rebalancing of the accounts after a period of high investment to facilitate
growth (Pagano et al., 1998). As mentioned above in referring to Brau et al.'s (2003)
work, the third reason is about the future sale of the company. Through the IPO process,
the market determines the value of the company so that the original owners can sell the
company as a whole in the future based on this market price (Zingales, 1995). Finally, the
motive that refutes the basic contentions of the above three says that companies decide to
go public when the entrepreneurs recognize that there is a possibility of failure, and it is
time to divest through the sale of stock to the public (Jain & Kini, 1999).
In summary, scholars report somewhat different views about the motivations for
going public (Jain & Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998; Brau & Fawcett, 2006). The
intention of this dissertation is not to take a position about any of these competing views
but to assess what happens after a firm goes public. These competing theories may be
helpful in explaining how and why the company comes to the IPO stage. However, the
focus of this study is on the happenings of post-IPO period. The following section will
provide an overview of the literature regarding the main areas of IPO research. The
section following that reviews the literature about the different measures of IPO
performance. Also reported are the various theories concerning a specific IPO
performance measure called underpricing. Further, included is background information
about the uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms, which constitute a major focus of
this study. Finally, a potential moderating variable, environment, will be introduced
before moving on to hypotheses development.
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Main Areas of IPO Research
In a recently published article, Certo and colleagues (2009) review the different
perspectives concerning IPO research from a macro management perspective. Certo and
his colleagues mention that, out of 103 articles, they managed to identify as IPO research
studies published in the last 20 years, 65 percent were conducted on topics related to
either corporate governance or upper echelons. This study builds on their review, and
also reports the related literature about corporate governance and upper echelons within
the IPO context.
Perhaps one of the most widely cited studies that reports on performance and
corporate governance within the IPO context is Ibbotson and Ritter (1995). These authors
talk about three different agency issues present in IPO situations. The first is information
asymmetry. An agency conflict arises between the parties involved in the IPO process
due to different levels of access to valuable information. Those with possibly better
knowledge about the company, such as the current owners and the underwriter, naturally
have a better idea about the firm's value versus those with less knowledge, such as the
outside investors. Thus, "high levels of information asymmetry characterize the IPO
process" (Certo et al., 2009:1343). The second agency issue is adverse selection (Stiglitz,
1985). Due to the presence of information asymmetry between the parties, the ones with
more information tend to take actions, such as the valuation and timing of the IPO, to
protect their own interests. Outside investors who have less information about the current
condition of the firm face adverse selection, which makes them question the
appropriateness of their investment decisions in the focal firm (Grinblat and Hwang,
1989). The final agency issue is moral hazard (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995 study). In
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addition to adverse selection, parties with more knowledge, such as the insiders or the
investment bankers who arrange the issuance of the stock, tend to take hidden actions,
such as pre-IPO manipulations, yielding what researchers refer to as a moral hazard.
These agency issues must be considered in any explanation of the behavior of decision
makers in an organization, such as the executives and the board of directors.

IPOs and Executives
Hambrick and Mason (1984), in their highly influential article, discuss the
importance of the dominant coalition on a firm's strategic decision making. The IPO
process happens to be one of the most important stages in a firm's life cycle (Jain & Kini,
1999) so the importance of the dominant coalition during the IPO stage, or in Hambrick
and Mason's (1984) term, upper echelons, becomes obvious. For that reason, a similar
amount of attention is paid to upper echelons, relative to that paid to corporate
governance in IPO research (Certo et al., 2009). One group of researchers has focused on
the impact of TMT compensation and ownership structure on pre- or post-IPO
performance (Marino, Castaldi & Dollinger, 2003; Certo, Daily, Cannella & Dalton,
2003; Nikbakht, Shahrokhi & Martin; 2007). Marion et al. (1989) highlight the need for
including executive compensation in IPO research. Certo et al. (2003) analyze the
potential signaling impact of executive stock options on firm IPO performance. They
observe that executives with more stock options are considered to have more trust in their
company's performance, and they will be more willing to take the required risks in the
future to facilitate the growth of the company. Nikbakht et al. (2007) also found that CEO
compensation structure can be seen as a signaling device at the pre-IPO valuation stage as
the researchers and the public considers CEO future (post-IPO) behavior being directly
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tied to the type of the compensation schema offered to him or her (e.g. cash, bonus,
stocks, and stock option grants). Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) propose that, if the
executives have greater bargaining power due to their compensation schemas, the firm
may experience a more successful IPO stage, although Lowry and Murphy (2007)
proposed that no such relationship exists between compensation schemas and IPO
success.
Another group of researchers is more interested in the ownership and founder
effect of the executives (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ritter, 1991; Certo, Convin, Daily &
Dalton, 2001; Fisher & Pollock, 2004). Leland and Pyle (1977) consider managementretained ownership as the main signaling device for IPO valuation. Fisher and Pollock
(2004), using U.S. IPOs in 1992, found that founder CEOs with a significant percentage
of shares following the IPO lower the chance of post-IPO firm failure. Certo et al. (2001)
investigate whether the presence of founder CEOs and the wealth they retain prior to IPO
have a positive impact on IPO underpricing. According to this study, the more equity the
founder CEOs retain in the firm right before the firm becomes publicly traded, (as
opposed to leaving money on the table as Ritter (1991) suggests) the more appreciation
he or she will experience based on the first day stock price appreciation. Certo and his
colleagues empirically show that firms with founder CEOs are more severely
underpriced, as the investment banker values the company less generously in order to
account for the inexperience of the management in running a publicly traded company
(Wat, 1983). Using data from the insurance industry, Napompech, Kroll and Shelor
(2002) report reduced ownership retention by the managers following an IPO increases
agency costs. Some researchers say that the presence of founder entrepreneur ownership
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can limit IPO underpricing (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). In a
Taiwanese setting, Yang and Sheu (2006) found that an equity stake owned by
management, and, specifically the top management, enhances the chance of survival just
as proposed by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Balatbat, Taylor and Walter
(2004), in an Australian setting, show that the amount of ownership executives retain
during the IPO stage does not affect subsequent firm performance during the first three
years of the post-IPO stage. However, they also mention that there seems to be some
impact on performance at the fourth and fifth years following the IPO. Using empirical
data from Canada, Li and McConomy (2004) are able to demonstrate how more
management ownership at the IPO is a primary determinant of IPO valuation. In support
of Hughes (1986) signaling model, Li and McConomy (2004) empirically showed that
management retained ownership increases firm value at the IPO. Bruton, Chahine and
Filatotchev (2009) report a curvilinear relationship between a founder's retained equity
and underpricing, which means, to a certain extent, a founder's ownership may eliminate
adverse selection, but in the meantime it may also encourage moral hazard.
One other group of researchers is more concerned about the experiences and
demographics of the executives during the IPO. According to Chemmanur and Paeglis
(2005), firms with higher quality managers are more likely to attract higher quality
underwriters and investors. Kor and Mahoney (2005) consider significant industry
experience as a determining factor for R&D investment, which in turn has a positive
effect on subsequent firm performance. In parallel, Amason, Shrader and Thompson
(2006) discuss the importance of TMT heterogeneity. This construct has also been
influential in studies that investigate the impact of complex environments on strategic
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decision making (Carpenter, 2002; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005) which also happens to be a
moderating factor in the relationships that are explained in detail later in this chapter.
Higgins and Gulati (2003) found that prominent downstream affiliations of upper
echelons attract prestigious underwriters to take roles in the IPO process.
In summary, as the main actors in the strategic decision making process, upper
echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) have received significant attention from finance
and macro management researchers. While upper echelons are the major focus of this
dissertation, more generalizable contentions about their impact are needed. One of the
contributions of this study will be to formulate a model based on the empirical results. In
order to create this new model, the literature addressing the relationship between a board
of directors and pre- and post- IPO performance must also be reviewed.

IPO and Board of Directors
The literature on the relationship between boards of directors and IPO
performance is not as in depth as that addressing upper echelons (Certo, Holmes &
Holcomb, 2007). Different time frames have been considered by researchers with regard
to the impact of the board of directors on IPO performance. In the short-term, Finkle
(1998) shows a positive relationship between the presence of directors appointed by
underwriters and the size of the IPO. Certo et al. (2001) also found that firms with
prestigious boards are less likely to be underpriced. Li and Naughton (2007), using
Chinese IPOs, consider the number of directors to be a factor in short-term post-IPO
performance while, in the long-term, abandoning duality seems to have a positive impact
on performance. Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) find that the proportion of outside
directors lessens the likelihood of underpricing using an entrepreneurial firm sample and
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suggest that the independence of the board is surely a signaling mechanism that lowers
underpricing. Contrary to that, Boulton, Smart and Zutter (2010) contend that
underpricing is more likely to happen in countries where outsider dominance on the
board is considered to be more important. Howton, Howton and Olson (2001) found that
IPO pricing anomalies are directly related with board structure and strong board of
directors can be a way to undermine the importance of information asymmetry and moral
hazard. Considering the internationalization of entrepreneurial firms following an IPO,
young IPOs are more likely to go international if the directors possess international
experience (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003). Chen and Dempere (2009) investigate
the impact of director composition on IPO bank acquisitions and show that equity based
compensation plans for directors reduce the likelihood of acquisitions after the IPO.
In summary, as the organizational leaders (Certo et al., 2007) who derive their
power from the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the board of directors has received
relatively less attention from IPO researchers. However, there is enough information
available to underline their importance during the pre-IPO and post-IPO stages. This
study will shed light on the impact of the board of directors on post-IPO operating
performance. Further discussion about directors and their effect on the performance of
young entrepreneurial firms that recently completed IPO will be provided in this chapter
under the hypotheses development section.

Underwriting Process
The focus of this study is on young entrepreneurial firms that just underwent an
IPO so it may be useful to review briefly the underwriting process firms go through. The
original legal background of IPOs goes back to the Securities Act of 1933. Based on this
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act, companies that decide to go public start with selecting an investment bank to walk
the company through the IPO process. This investment bank, or the so-called
underwriter, can be an individual company or a leader of a consortium composed of
several investment banks. There are several factors an IPO company takes into account
when selecting an underwriter. For instance, prior relationship with the investment bank
through the board members (i.e. board members may have been involved in IPOs of other
companies, particularly the venture capitalists), prior reputation of the underwriter or the
expertise and experience of the underwriter with the issuer's industry (Ellis, Michaely &
O'Hara, 1999). The underwriting starts with preparing an outline of the underwriter
agreement called "letter of intent." In this document, parties agree on the fees and
commissions associated with the IPO process. For instance, the underwriter specifies
what percentage of the gross spread (the difference between the price of the stocks that
are bought from the issuer by the underwriter and the price of the stocks when they
become publicly traded) it is going to charge. Following the due diligence period, once
both parties agree on all the financial and administrative issues, they sign a document
called "underwriting agreement." By signing this agreement, the underwriter commits to
buy the securities at a specific price.
The interaction with SEC starts after the parties sign the underwriting agreement.
Due to Securities Act of 1933, the issuer and the underwriter prepare the registration
statement. There are primarily two parts of a registration statement. First one, named as
"prospectus," contains information that the IPO company has to provide to the public,
such as the prior performance of the company or the background information about the
board of directors and top management team (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999). The company
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and the underwriter are responsible for the contents in the prospectus (Beatty & Zajac,
1994). The second part of the registration statement, which is called "Part II," contains
information that SEC inspects on behalf of the public. After the registration statement is
filed the SEC it becomes a "preliminary prospectus" and SEC will respond to it within 20
days with the amendments it requires to be enacted.
Once the SEC approval is received, the period that researchers call as "road
show" begins. This is the period where underwriter contacts institutional investors on
behalf of the company. After a period of various presentations by the company and the
underwriter to institutional investors (they do not have to institutional investors but
underwriters tend to prefer them to individual investors), based on the interest on the
company stocks, the underwriter comes up with an offer price. It should be noted that,
none of the sales to institutional investors are official until the effective date. The
underwriter aims to get two to three times oversubscription to create a "good IPO" (Ellis
et al., 1999). This can only happen if the institutional investors believe that the company
is likely to be successful both at the IPO and after the IPO. In fact, that is why
underpricing of an IPO is said to be associated with positive signals about a company
(Ritter, 1991). The final prospectus statement with the price amendment and the number
of shares going to sold is published on the morning of the effective date. On the morning
of the effective date, company stocks open for trading and the institutional investors
officially acquire shares based on the previously agreed price. If the closing price at the
end of that day is higher than the offer price, the company is said to have "left money on
the table" (Ritter, 1991; Ritter & Welch, 2002) or in other words underpriced (Arthurs et
al., 2008).
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Although details of signaling theory is provided in other sections of this study, it
may be useful to mention why underpricing is an important signaling mechanism based
on signaling theory assumptions. According to the seminal studies of signaling models
(Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989), by underpricing
their stocks, IPO firms signal future firm quality. Although the original owners had just
left money on the table (Ritter, 1991), the only way they can make up for their initial loss
is through future profit of the company from the operations financed by the money raised
at the IPO and subsequent sales of stocks. In other words, signaling model does not only
consider pre-IPO signals that investors take into account for valuation of the firm but also
the underpricing which happens at the end of the first trading day. In fact that is why,
some scholars recently aimed to investigate the direct relationship between IPO
underpricing and post-IPO operating performance (i.e. Jain, 1996; Zheng & Stangeland,
2007). Once the firm is underpriced some institutional investors may choose to sell their
stocks right away to experience profit while others may choose to hold on to these stocks
if they adopt a long-term investment strategy. Still others may gather shares in the
secondary market to accumulate a controlling stake in the company (five percent or
more). The underlying theme of this study is not about short-term institutional investors
but it is about the long-term ones which are likely to be listed as blockholders in the first
annual statement following the IPO.
Before closing this section, the last concept that needs to mentioned is the "lockup" period. SEC requires that the pre-IPO owners of a company cannot sell their shares
for a certain time period (usually for 180 days). This period is called the "lock-up" period
(Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998). In other words, the owners of shares mentioned in the
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prospectus statement are restricted from selling shares for a certain time period once the
company becomes publicly traded. The implication of this requirement within the context
of this study is; the ownership structure changes following the IPO and subsequent
changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance can easily be tested
through the comparison of prospectus statement and subsequent annual statements.

Theories of Underpricing
Several theoretical explanations have been offered by scholars to explain the
many unknowns about the underpricing of IPO shares. This section provides some
background information about these theories so that the upcoming hypotheses section
may make more intuitive sense.
Certo et al. (2001), abstracted from Tinic (1988) and Ritter (1998), provides
different theories explaining underpricing. As they summarize, there are several theories
to be considered in explaining the so-called underpricing phenomena. The risk-averse
underwriter hypothesis focuses on the investment bankers. This theory suggests that
investment bankers set IPO offer prices lower on purpose to account for the risks
associated with new publicly traded firms (Reilly, 1973). The monopsony power
hypothesis is more concerned about the reputation of the underwriters. According to this
hypothesis, highly reputable investment bankers set the prices lower so that the customers
they sell the IPO stocks to get compensated through stock price appreciation on the very
first day (Baron & Holmstrom, 1980). The speculative bubble hypothesis proposes that,
due to speculation on the first day by investors who were unable to access shares during
the pre-IPO stage, the first day closing price reflects such investors bidding up the stock.
The implicit insurance hypothesis concentrates on the legal side of the IPO pricing. This

28
hypothesis contends that if the offer price is low, the chances of subsequent legal action
taken against the underwriter by initial investors is reduced, so, once again, the
underwriter sets the offer price lower than what it is supposed to be (Nakatani, 1984).
The market feedback hypothesis posits that, during the pre-IPO stage, the investment
banker uses the feedback from the preferred investors to calculate the offer price
(Jegadeesh, Weinstein & Welch, 1993). Rationally, these preferred investors set the value
of the firm lower than what it really is so they get to experience appreciation in their
investments once the first day closing price is lower than the offer price (underpricing).
According to the ownership dispersion hypothesis, the focal firm will prefer an
underpriced stock so that due to high demand, no one investor can gather a controlling
interest (Booth & Chua, 1996). The asymmetric information hypothesis, one of the most
popular hypotheses, proposes that the natural reason for underpricing is the presence of
information asymmetry between investors, underwriters and the issuing firm (Brennan &
Kraus, 1987). The winners curse hypothesis, is also related to information asymmetry.
According to this hypothesis, informed investors may not have the sufficient wealth to
buy out the IPO shares, so issuers underprice their IPO shares to attract uninformed
investors (Rock, 1986). Last, but certainly not least, is the popular signaling hypothesis.
This hypothesis is the major theoretical foundation I rely upon to explain the series of
relationships proposed in my model. According to the signaling hypothesis, or the socalled signaling model (Leland & Pyle, 1977), underpricing acts as a signaling
mechanism about the firm's future as it may lead to subsequent sales of stocks for higher
prices after the IPO (Welch, 1989; Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). One last theory that also
must be mentioned is screening theory. As Sanders and Boivie (2004) summarize,
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screening theory is very similar to the signaling model. The main difference is that the
signaling model historically concentrated on an informed buyer acting first, while
screening theory assumes that the buyer of the stock is acting with some filtering
routines. Based on screening theory, higher quality issuers underprice their IPO price on
purpose, thus leaving some money on the table, and the way they make up for this
sacrifice is to get involved in additional issuing activity in the future at a higher price,
which is a mirror image of the basic contentions of signaling model as specified by
Sanders and Boivie (2004:169). As theoretical explanations, both the signaling model and
screening theory make intuitive sense. Based on a combination of these two explanations
of post-IPO investor behavior, this dissertation proposes that once the firm, particularly a
young entrepreneurial one, is underpriced, the underpricing acts as a signaling
mechanism for active investors to acquire shares and ask for subsequent changes in the
corporate governance structure of the firm once they become new owners. The result is
lower operating performance due to interventions with the firm's entrepreneurial
efficacy. Further discussion of the signaling model and its application in this model will
be provided in the hypotheses development section.
Before moving to the section that covers the measures of IPO performance, I
believe a brief literature review about the consequences of IPO underpricing may clarify
potential ambiguities about the underlying theme of my study. Particularly, the changes
in ownership structure following the IPO is of interest as the focus of this study on the
consequences of ownership structures following an IPO. Two studies stand out among
others regarding the changes in ownership following underpriced IPOs. Stoughton and
Zechner (1998) report that following an underpriced IPO, a more concentrated block
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ownership structure is likely to emerge. Their reasoning is that only large stockholders
can acquire stocks of underpriced IPOs and their intentions will be to monitor
management after acquisition of these shares. Brennan and Franks (1997) approach the
situation from a different perspective. According to their reduced monitoring hypothesis,
underpriced IPOs will be related to more dispersed ownership. These authors contend
that instead of concentrated ownership, several smaller owners may acquire shares after
the IPO which may lower their power to monitor managerial actions. Although the
results are mixed about both studies' views (Hill, 2006; Arugaslan, Cook & Kieschnick,
2004), there is a need to shed some light on the ongoing debate about post-IPO ownership
structure changes due to underpricing. One of the contributions of this study will be do
that within the context of young entrepreneurial firms.

Measures of IPO Performance
In their IPO research summary article, Certo et al. (2009) discuss two different
time frames to assess IPO performance. The first one is short-term performance. Most of
the finance literature is concerned with what happens to stock prices on the opening day
of trading (Ritter, 1991; Fisher & Pollock, 2004; Heeley, Matusik & Jain, 2007). The
primary measures of IPO short-term performance deal with first day closing price. If the
difference between the first day opening price and closing price is different from zero that
means the company is either overpriced or underpriced (Aurthurs et al., 2008). If the
closing price is higher than the opening price, the underwriter has valued the company for
less than what it really is worth (Heeley et al., 2007). In other words, the pre-IPO owners
did not get what they could have gotten from the IPO. Thus, as some authors say, they
just "left money on the table" (Ritter, 1991). Underpricing is probably the most often
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used variable in IPO research due to its importance in both the finance literature (Ritter
and Welch, 2002) and the management literature (Certo, Dalton & Daily, 2001).
According to some authors, this is the primary measure to assess litigation risk of an IPO
firm (Tinic, 1988) and the amount of information asymmetry (Ritter & Welch, 2002;
Loughran & Ritter, 2004), while for others it is one of the most important signaling
mechanisms about a firm's future (Anderson, Beard & Born, 1995). In this dissertation,
this is the primary variable that will be used to measure to what extent underpricing acts
as a signaling mechanism about the firm's future.
Underpricing is not the only variable used by researchers to measure short-term
IPO performance. One of the other most popular measures of short-term IPO
performance is the amount of proceeds raised. IPO proceeds reflect the capital gathered
from the first-time offering (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). According to some authors
(Pagano et al., 1998), the amount of proceeds raised during the IPO process determines
how successful the management was in convincing the public about the real value of the
company. Other short-term IPO performance measures that Certo et al. (2009) mention
are: IPO price premium, representing the extent the initial price exceeds the book value
of the assets (Fama & French, 1992), which is similar to Tobin's Q as a market-based
measure of firm performance (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) and market valuation, which is
measured by the total market capitalization of the firm right after the IPO, particularly at
the end of the first day (Sanders & Boivie, 2004).
Surprisingly, IPO researchers are not that interested with the long-term IPO
performance. The measures of long-term post-IPO performance are not that different
from classical performance measures of companies used in non-IPO based studies.
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Primarily, researchers utilize either accounting-based or market-based measures to assess
long-term IPO firm performance (Certo et al., 2010). Sales growth, return on assets,
return on sales, return on equity, cash flow from operations, operating margin, and net
profit are the primary accounting-based measures used (Amason, Shrader &Tompson,
2006; Certo et al., 2009). Regarding market based measures which represent stock
performance over the long run, holding period returns (Kroll et al., 2007) and cumulative
abnormal returns (Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008), are two of the most popular financial
market measures used in the literature.
Obviously, both short-term and long-term measures of IPO performance can only
be used for assessing the performance of the firms that managed to go public and survive
after the IPO for a certain period. Some scholars consider this survival as another
measure of IPO success (Fisher & Pollock, 2004) particularly for young entrepreneurial
firms (Jain & Kini, 2000) since a significant portion of IPO firms declare bankruptcy
during the first few years following their IPO (Welbourne & Andrews, 1996; Certo et al.,
2010). In summary, different measures of IPO performance are present in the literature.
As mentioned previously, the focus of this dissertation will be on underpricing as a
signaling mechanism that triggers subsequent changes in firm ownership and corporate
governance mechanisms. The next section discusses the literature regarding the
uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms in an IPO setting.

Uniqueness of Young Entrepreneurial Firms
Classical contentions of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) involve
corporate governance issues like the use of board independence and performance based
compensation in order to align the interests of agents (executives) and principals
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(owners). Pioneering studies in the field, like Booth and Deli (1996), Dalton, Daily,
Ellstrom and Johanson (2003), used large and well-established firms to test the
propositions of agency theory. As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) recognized that
traditional governance mechanisms may result in unexpected consequences for young
entrepreneurial firms, there is obviously a need to look at them from a different
perspective as Kroll et al. (2007) suggest.
Young firms, particularly the ones which recently completed IPOs, are at a
vulnerable point in their evolution. They have to facilitate the transition from private
ownership to public ownership while trying to keep up with the regulatory requirements
of the governing bodies (Kroll et al., 2007). These types of firms, founded on
entrepreneurial efficacy, face several uncertainties stemming from their inexperience with
market mechanisms. Stinchcombe (1965) names this situation the "liability of newness."
Although they seem to be simple business entities because of their size and age, due to
this liability of newness, they may constitute more promising study units for management
research (Kroll et al., 2007). Executives of young firms have access to limited resources
and thus have limited strategic options (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Under these
conditions, the creativity of the executives and their risk assessment abilities become
more important. Thus, more interesting managerial implications may come from studies
conducted on young entrepreneurial firms.
The strength of an economy does not only depend on giant, well-established
corporations. If that were the case, the recent bankruptcies of GM and Lehman Brothers
would have diminished the hopes for the future of the U.S. economy. The reality is small
to medium size enterprises are the main drivers of economies, both in the U.S. and
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abroad. Considering this fact, studying young entrepreneurial firms also has more
practical implications. If corporate governance research aims to provide the stakeholders
of corporations with better insight into how to be successful, then corporate governance
research focused on young entrepreneurial firms should provide valuable guidance
concerning governance practices. The outcome of such practices may be vital to the
whole economy. Kroll et al. (2007) found that classical contentions of agency theory do
not apply to young entrepreneurial firms. These firms are likely to perform better, at least
during the initial years, if the majority of their boards are composed of original TMT
members. Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) point out that founders and managers of
entrepreneurial companies are in greater need of sharing their tacit knowledge through
strong personal and stable relationships. In other words, as these companies are more
people dependent, the implications of studies conducted on them will not only be of
interest for macro management researchers but for micromanagement researchers as well.
Before the hypotheses are developed, the last topic that should be addressed is
environment. As suggested in Figure 1.1, environmental factors are proposed to play an
important role. The next section is a brief introduction to two competing literature
streams about external environment.

Impact of Environment
Several competing theories have been advanced suggesting environmental
uncertainty as a key determinant of the appropriateness of the rational strategic decision
processes (Priem, Rasheed & Kotulic, 1995). Fredrickson (1984) says that an
organization's strategy determines the extent of the match or alignment between its
external environment and its internal structure and process. Fredrickson (1984)
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differentiates between synoptic and incremental models of strategy formulation. Synoptic
is based on a rational model of decision making while incremental is more concerned
with providing a more accurate description of how organizations actually make strategic
decisions. The most fundamental issue in synoptic strategy is the concept of
comprehensiveness. This concept can be defined as the extent to which an organization
attempts to be exhaustive and inclusive in making and integrating decisions.
Comprehensiveness involves the careful collection of information to evaluate various
strategic alternatives, the analysis of the available information and the making of detailed
long-term plans based on that information. Fredrickson (1984) and Fredrickson and
Mitchell (1984) report that rational strategic decision processes are associated with
superior performance in stable environments and inferior performance in unstable
environments. Priem et al. (1995) define an unstable environment as an uncertain
environment; that is one in which it is difficult to identify, measure and predict variables
and causal relationships.
If a dynamic environment can be considered as an uncertain one, then Fredrickson
and colleagues propose that since there is not enough data and information,
comprehensiveness in terms of analysis, which involves different decision makers
coming together around a well-developed strategy, may not be applicable. In these types
of environments, as there is too much uncertainty, a fast decision making process is
needed and, with the limited amount of information, comprehensiveness under the
umbrella of strategic rationality may not be possible.
Contrary to the contentions of Fredrickson and his colleagues, Mintzberg (1973)
proposes that some formal comprehensive planning may yield superior performance.
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Eisenhardt (1989) and Miller and Friesen (1983) suggest that decision makers in dynamic
environments, instead of departing from analytical requirements of comprehensive
decision making, actually accelerate their cognitive processing. Under dynamic
conditions, decision makers use more information and consider more alternatives.
Besides being analytically comprehensive, they also turn out to be integratively
comprehensive. In dynamic environments there should be quick and intelligent responses.
Thus, according to this stream of research, comprehensive decision making may lead to
better performance in dynamic environments.
The other two dimensions of environment, as discussed by Dess and Beard
(1984), should also be mentioned at this point. For instance, environmental complexity,
determined by the presence of heterogeneity in the environmental variables, is known to
have a significant impact on strategic decision making (Aldrich, 1979; Boyd, 1995) and
subsequent firm performance (McArthur & Nystrom, 1991). In addition, munificence,
which is about whether critical resources are available or abundant in the environment, is
another known determinant of firm performance (Goll & Rasheed, 1997).
In summary, all of these research streams consider environment as an important
factor to consider for firm performance. This study considers it to have a moderating
effect on the relationship between firm performance and TMT composition and board
structure. Further details about this proposition will be provided in the hypotheses
development section.
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Hypotheses Development
Underpricing is present if the stock issue price is lower than the first day closing
price (Ritter, 1991). This means that if underpricing is present, those who gather shares
from the underwriting process experience gains in their investment at the end of the first
day. From a financial perspective, this is definitely what the initial investors want as long
as they end up selling the shares for a profit. From the original management's perspective
(i.e. leaving money on the table or appreciation of retained ownership) has already been
discussed. However, the impact of this situation on subsequent movements in the firm's
ownership structure needs further discussion. The first hypothesis is related to this
question: what happens to the ownership structure of the firms that experience significant
underpricing when they undergo an IPO?
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) discuss the importance of underpricing as a signaling
mechanism that can be used by investors to distinguish between good firms and bad
firms: "Underpricing the firm's initial offering (which is an immediate loss to the initial
owners) is a credible signal that the firm is good to investors, because only good firms
can be expected to recoup this loss after the [firm's superior] performance is realized"
(Allen & Faulhaber, 1989:304). What exactly does the term "good firm" mean?
Obviously, if a firm is a good one, it is more likely to perform better in the future, and the
investors in such firms are more likely to experience higher stock price appreciations and
possibly steady income in the form of dividends (Welch, 1989). A logical investor would
obviously like to invest in IPO firms that are considered to be "good" (Grinblatt &
Hwang, 1989) as these IPO firms may offset the initial loss, due to underpricing, by
future earnings.
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Young entrepreneurial firms need to provide the public with more signals of
quality than do well-established, large institutions. Considering the association of
extensive information asymmetry with IPOs (Rock, 1986), underwriters definitely need
to do more in the case of young firms to "leave a good taste in investors' mouths"
(Ibbotson, 1975: 264) by valuing the firm less than what it is really worth. In other words,
it is safe to say that younger and smaller firms are more likely to experience underpricing
(Jain, 1994). Though the question remains: "once a young entrepreneurial firm IPO is
underpriced, does that trigger post-IPO investors to step in and gather shares?" The
answer to this question forms the basis of the first hypothesis.
A recent study suggests that "IPO firms are characterized by different large-block
holders of retained equity after listing" (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine & Wright, 2010:
492). There is empirical evidence suggesting that investors are more likely to purchase
blocks of stocks in publicly traded companies when they perceive expected benefits to
exceed expected costs (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler, 1998).
Considering signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977), firms with significant underpricing
signal quality and higher expected returns in the future (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). This
means that, with their limited knowledge, if investors perceive that the cost associated
with buying blocks of shares in an underpriced IPO of a young entrepreneurial firm will
be lower than the potential benefits likely to be experienced in the future, they would be
likely to step in to gather share blocks in the company. It should be noted that share
blocks are defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) to mean direct
ownership of five percent or more of a firm's outstanding shares. This research proposes
that, once the firm is underpriced, new potential blockholders are likely to emerge within
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a reasonable time period. Some researchers contend that the managers underprice shares
during the IPO in order to spread out ownership by making the firm attractive to small
shareholders (Brennan & Franks, 1997). Their reasoning behind such action is to avoid
active monitoring by future blockholders. However, others contend the opposite actually
happens. For instance, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) suggest that, through underpricing,
managers, perhaps unintentionally, create an incentive for potential large shareholders to
buy the shares at a relatively low price right after the IPO. "The incentive is necessary
because monitoring is costly to blockholders" (Howton, 2006:420). Because of their
collective level of ownership, blockholders possess the power to influence organizational
decisions (Sanders & Boivie, 2004).
Relative to well-established firms, there is empirical evidence to recommend the
adoption of different agency perspectives for young entrepreneurial firms (Kroll et al.,
2007). Being a well-established firm is already a signal of quality (Dunbar, 2000; Valero,
Lee & Cai, 2009) while it is harder for younger firms to use different mechanisms as
signals of their quality (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). With this great information asymmetry
present in the IPO process for entrepreneurial firms, underpricing should serve as the
primary determinant of firm quality. Bruton, Filatotochev, Chahine and Wright (2010)
mention that corporate governance research has already informed us about the presence
of blockholders in relatively larger mature firms, but little has been done related to
entrepreneurial firms that undergo an IPO. Merton (1987) suggests that being listed on a
major stock exchange may help the firm to be more recognizable by the public. Large,
well-established firms already receive enough attention from the public, which may not
be the case for private and smaller firms. Once they get listed, the public may be more
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interested in what happens in these types of firms. As the sample in this study consists of
young entrepreneurial firms that have just completed an IPO, looking at the changes in
their ownership structures following an IPO should definitely be of interest for
researchers. Using the signaling model (Leland & Pyle, 1977) adopted in this study, the
proposal is that if an entrepreneurial firm is underpriced during the IPO, blockholders
with different objectives (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002) will take that as a
signal about the firm's promising future and will rush to accumulate block holdings in the
company. Based on this contention, the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hi: Young entrepreneurial firms experiencing significant underpricing will
attract potential investors who acquire blockholder ownership positions in the
focal firms.
Once the ownership structure of the firm changes, one might expect subsequent
changes in corporate governance mechanisms. According to Denis, Denis and Sarin
(1997), ownership structure has a direct impact on executive turnover. In this study, the
authors show that the presence of a new outside blockholder increases the likelihood of
executive turnover; however, this is not surprising. Well-known contentions of agency
theory are quite specific about interest alignment between the owners and the executives
(Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From an agency
perspective, an outside blockholder will be willing to bear monitoring costs and have
someone watching out for his/her interests. A rational active investor probably would like
to appoint at least some of his/her agents either as executives or directors or both.
Finance literature is also very clear about the propensity of owners to monitor what is
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going on in the company through their own agents (Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, 1994;
Kahn&Winton, 1998).
At this point, a brief review about blockholder ownership may be useful. In their
seminal article, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) mathematically demonstrate why owning
only five percent in a company can give that owner the right to be involved in the
strategic decision making process. Parallel to that study, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993)
empirically verified that blockholder ownership is associated with corporate restructuring
and this is because the blockholders are able to put pressure on executives because of the
five percent share they hold in the company. In a more recent article, Sanders and Boivie
(2004) showed that blockholder ownership is strongly associated with firm valuation of
publicly traded firms. Probably due for that reason, the SEC requires publicly traded
companies to report all the owners with five percent or more shares in their annual
reports. In addition, anyone who acquires beneficial ownership of five percent or has to
file Schedule 13D within 10 days of that acquisition. Also at this point, a brief overview
of Schedule 13D may be useful to understand how large shareholders are able to
influence firm practices, including the ones with corporate governance policies. Item 4 of
Schedule 13D is related with the intentions of the new large shareholder. Although the
details of this item is beyond the scope of this study, in summary the new beneficial
owner notifies the SEC and the public about its intentions with regard to new security
issuance, mergers, acquisitions, sale or transfer of assets, any changes about current
capitalization policies and similar issues. Particularly, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2008:3973) report that "section d" of Schedule 13D Item 4 is as follows:

42

"any change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer,
including any plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors
or to fill any existing vacancies on the board."
Thus, new blockholders are able initiate changes in the corporate governance
mechanisms of the firms in which they acquired controlling shares in. They can choose to
do this either directly by electing directors and voting on changes in the corporate
structure of the company or through informal negotiations and discussions (Crongvist &
Fahlenbrach, 2008). Either way, their presence is likely to associated with changes in
corporate governance practices. In other words, both theoretically and legally, only five
percent ownership is sufficient to gain influence over the current firm governance
systems.
In contrast to privately owned companies, where the original founders act with
complete freedom, publicly traded companies have to seek approval of their boards of
directors for major strategic decisions (Burton, Helliar & Power, 2004). Bethel and
Liebeskind (1993) report that blockholder ownership is associated with corporate
restructuring, which, in the authors' terms, is an indication of pressure imposed on
management by the new blockholders. Bouresli, Davidson and Abdulsalam (2002)
empirically demonstrate that active investors in publicly traded companies will take
active roles in reconfiguring the corporate governance mechanisms of the firms they have
controlling shares in. Thus, it is more than likely that the new blockholders who acquired
shares after the IPO due to the signaling affect of the severe underpricing will ask for
changes in TMT and board structure. Corporate governance rules of the NYSE (New
York Stock Exchange) and NASDAQ (National Association of Security Dealers
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Automated Quotations) require companies to have independent outsiders in their boards
(Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Kroll et al., 2007) although the empirical results regarding
the benefits of such outsider dominance are mixed (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson,
1998). Particularly in the case of young entreprenurial firms, there is strong empirical
evidence of problems associated with such mandates. Kroll et al. (2007) for example,
showed that outside-dominated boards designed to mitigate agency problems (Booth &
Deli, 1996) are not effective for younger firms. However, active blockholders may not
acknowledge that fact. For the purpose of watching out for their interests, they will be
looking to have their own people in key positions. Obviously, the first key position that
comes to mind is being a member of the TMT. This research proposes that, following the
changes in ownership structure, new blockholders will ask some of the original TMT
members to step down and will replace them with new ones. This will automatically
create a higher rate of change in TMT structure in the years following the IPO.
Obviously, as new executives come in and the old ones leave, one should be able to
observe considerable differences between the TMT structures over the years following
the IPO. Like other studies, this study considers a five-year time period to assess whether
such a relationship exists (Hillier, Linn & Colgan, 2005). Throughout the five years
following the IPOs of the young entrepreneurial firms, it is proposed that the rate of
change in TMT turnover should be higher once the new blockholders emerge in the
firm's ownership structure. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H2: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of young
entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in TMT membership
over the subsequent five-year period.
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Beyond the higher rate of change in TMT membership, the same logic may also
apply to board membership. As Fama and Jensen (1983) specify, boards derive their
power from the owners so their structures will be based on the actions of the owners. In
the case of young entrepreneurial firms, the chance of owners asking for changes in board
structure is equal to the chances of them asking for changes in TMT structure, if not more
so. Kaufman and Englander (2005) discuss the need for IPO firms to include outside
directors on the board for the purpose of satisfying external constituents. Deutsch and
Ross (2003), in parallel, highlight the importance of the presence of outside directors in
IPO firms to attract external resources. IPO firms, at this vulnerable point of their
evolution, are in need of external resources (Kroll et al., 2007). If new owners, with fresh
interest in the company, increase the chances of access to external resource as Deutsch
and Ross (2003) suggest, then their requests for changes in the status quo within the
company will be taken more seriously. Considering the blockholders' legitimate power
on top of that, it is logical to expect new directors to be appointed by them to the board.
Beatty and Zajac (1994) propose several mechanisms associated with monitoring
and related incentives. The first mechanism is the classic outside dominance of the board
as mandated by agency theory researchers (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The
second involves tying the incentives of the directors to those of the owners in order to
create more vigilant monitoring (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). The third mechanism
involves separating the CEO and chairman positions (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). The
fourth and fifth mechanisms Beaty and Zajac (1994) discuss are directly related to this
study. First of all, they mention the possible effects of a large equity holder. They
contend, blockholders will be keen for monitoring practices so they are more likely to be
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active in appointment decisions. Also, in the case of IPOs, venture capitalists, who are
likely to acquire shares well before the IPO, are prone to be active monitors. An active
shareholder, either as a regular blockholder or as a venture capitalist, will be playing a
role in board structuring. Therefore, blockholders who acquire shares after the IPO will
be likely to appoint their own directors to the board. As a previous study suggests, the
"greater the proportion of affiliated board members, the easier it is for an entrenched
controlling shareholder to pursue its objectives" (Yeh, Shu & Guo, 2008:147).
Considering a blockholder as an owner of five percent or more controlling shares in a
firm (Kroll et al., 1997), their presence should be associated with a higher rate of change
in board structure. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of young
entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in board membership
over the subsequent five-year period.
In addition to the direct relationships between blockholder ownership structure
changes and higher rates of change in TMT and board membership, an indirect
relationship between blockholder ownership and TMT change may also exist. If a board
is a reflection of the owners and is expected to serve the owner's interests (Fama &
Jensen, 1983), then one may expect new directors, appointed by the new owners, to
request changes in TMT composition. In other words, the higher rate of change in TMT
composition associated with ownership structure change may be the result of changes in
the board.
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) document the connection between the power of
the board and its potential impact on corporate governance issues. Boards are legally
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empowered to act on behalf of the owners (Finkelstein, 1992). Directors have the power
to hire, fire, and promote executives (Mace, 1971). Shivdasani and Yermack (1999:1829)
observe: "Directors are voted into office by stockholders and have a fiduciary
responsibility to protect stockholders' interests. Along with their legal duties of reviewing
the corporation's major plans and actions, directors are charged with selecting,
compensating, evaluating, and, when appropriate, dismissing top managers." This means
that, not only will the new directors look after the interests of the blockholder owners, but
they will also perform the hiring and firing of new executives based on the new owners'
expectations. In the case of IPOs, I discussed earlier about the new blockholders and their
association with higher rates of change in TMT composition and board structure. Beyond
that, new blockholders', instead of directly dealing with the appointment of executives,
may also ask the newly appointed directors to initiate change for them. It may be
reasonable to expect changes in TMT composition following the changes in board
structure. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formed as complementary
to Hypotheses 2:
H4: Higher rates of change in board composition of young entrepreneurial firms
will be associated with a higher rate of change in TMT membership over the
subsequent five-year period.
To this point, nothing has been mentioned regarding what happens to performance
following the changes in corporate governance mechanisms. The next set of hypotheses
deals with this issue. Obviously, management researchers, in general, aim to address the
question "what is the outcome" of the strategic management process. In the case of forprofit organizations, the ultimate goal of a firm is to enhance the value of its
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shareholders' investment. For entrepreneurial firms which just recently underwent an IPO
the goal is no different. However the uniqueness, as already discussed, is important. The
applicability of popular theories like agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and
resource-based view (Barney, 1991) in the young entrepreneurial context must next be
reviewed.
Over the years, researchers in different fields have focused on the stock market
performance of the IPO companies (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Mikkelson et al., 1997,
Pham, Kalev & Steen, 2003). This is probably due to the popular belief that most IPO
firms fail within the first few years following the IPO (Ritter, 1991; Loughran & Ritter,
1995). Instead of paying attention to the long run operating performance of young IPO
firms, researchers tend to concentrate more on the short run stock performance (Ritter &
Welch, 2002). Recently, some researchers considered two-year holding period returns as
a measure of post-IPO performance (Kroll et al., 2007, Walters et al., 2010). Other
researchers highlight the need for considering longer periods to assess post-IPO
performance (Fisher & Pollock, 2004). So far, it has been proposed that, due to certain
signaling mechanisms during the IPO stage, new owners will be attracted to the young
entrepreneurial firms. Once they acquire controlling shares, directly or indirectly, they are
likely to request changes in corporate governance systems (e.g. changes in TMT
compositions and board structures). What happens afterwards is the focus of next set of
hypothesis.
First of all, what happens when the original TMT is changed? Recalling the
resource-based view may be helpful in answering this question. As Barney (1991)
observes, firms need valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources to gain a
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sustainable competitive advantage. One type of resource is obviously the firm's
executives (Berman, Down & Hill, 2002). Particularly in the case of young
entrepreneurial firms, executives with extensive knowledge of, and experience with the
firm are definitely a potential source of competitive advantage (Kor, 2003). In fact, these
executives are the ones who brought the firm to the IPO stage. In smaller firms,
companies rely heavily on the knowledge base available within the boundaries of the
organization. Once a new owner asks for changes in the TMT composition, some of these
knowledgeable executives will probably be asked to step down while others, who are
appointed by the new blockholders, either directly or indirectly, will take their places.
This dissertation proposes that, by doing so, firms lose a significant source of competitive
advantage. This should result in lower operating performance in the five-year period
following the IPO. Fisher and Pollock (2004) argue that post-IPO success is enhanced
with more cohesive management teams. Kroll et al. (2007) found strong evidence of
enhanced post-IPO performance with original executives in place. According to that
study, the contentions of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may not be the
answer for young entrepreneurial firms. Jain and Kini (1994) report that post-IPO
performance will suffer less if the portion of control retained by the original executives is
greater. Original TMT members, with their long-term tenure with the company and their
contribution to the entrepreneurial efficacy of it, possess valuable tacit knowledge and a
commonly shared vision (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990, Kor, 2003). Therefore, the
performance of these firms should suffer once the TMT membership rate of change
accelerates. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formed:
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Hs: Higher rates of change in TMT membership of young entrepreneurial firms
will be associated with lower operating performance over the subsequent fiveyear period.
Obviously, not only may changes in TMT composition have a detrimental effect
on post-IPO performance, but other organizational leadership, such as the directors
(Certo et al., 2007), should also be considered. Referring to the resource based view
(Barney, 1991) once again, directors, just like executives, constitute an important
resource for a company (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The benefits may be in
different forms for different types of directors. According to Hillman, Cannella and
Paetzold (2000), outside directors can be classified as business experts, who are ex-senior
executives and directors of other firms, support specialists, who unlike business experts
lack general management experience but possess expertise in an important area such as
law, and community influentials, who happen to have connections to the outside world
(e.g., politicians). Although the differences among these three types of directors are
beyond the scope of the study, it is proposed that any of them who are appointed by the
new blockholders will be likely to have an impact on the firm's performance.
Beatty and Zajac (1994) observed that, the traditional board independence
recommendation of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is not as important in the
IPO context. The importance of keeping the original executives in place for younger
firms has already been discussed. The same logic also applies to directors. In fact, if the
tacit knowledge and shared vision of the executives is a source of competitive advantage
(Kor, 2003), then the board that historically facilitated this connection through
appropriate monitoring and involvement in the strategic decision making process, is just
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as important a source of competitive advantage. Researchers already consider directors to
be a reflection of the owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The same researchers also suggest
that, in smaller firms, for better performance, strategic decision making needs to be
retained by the same individuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983, Walters et al., 2010). The
dominant coalition in a firm, which is composed of the strategic leaders (Certo et al.
2007), is likely to take the firm further with a shared vision (Nelson, 2003). In the
context of young entrepreneurial firms that just underwent an IPO, the new owners, who
are inexperienced with the focal firm and who acquired shares because of the positive
signals they perceived following the IPO, can see less clearly what needs to be done.
Kroll et al. (2007) not only recommend that the original executives stay in place, but also
prescribe a board that is primarily composed of them. As agency problems are less acute
in younger and smaller firms (Walters et al., 2010), a more cohesive TMT and Board of
Directors may be needed for better performance. In that regard, a similar relationship is
likely to be observed between board composition and firm performance as observed
between TMT membership and firm performance within the five years following the
IPO. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H6: Higher rates of change in board membership of young entrepreneurial firms
will be associated with lower operating performance over the subsequent fiveyear period.
One of the fundamental contributions of the study of strategic management is an
emphasis on the need to adapt to the environment. As Duncan (1972) defines it, the
environment is the totality of physical and social factors that are taken directly into
consideration in the decision making behavior of the individuals in organizations. Duncan
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(1972) also makes a distinction between the internal environment, which is composed of
physical and social factors within the boundaries of an organization, and the external
environment, which is composed of social and physical factors outside the boundaries of
an organization. As the external environment is outside the boundaries of the
organization, it is almost impossible for a firm to control it but to deal with it by creating
some internal mechanisms (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).

In the case of a young

entrepreneurial firm that just underwent an IPO, those internal mechanisms may be the
entrepreneurial efficacy of the original TMTs and directors.
Dess and Beard (1984) specify three dimensions of the environment that are
important for its assessment. These are munificence, which is the capacity of the market
to support sustained growth, dynamism, which is the stability-instability of the market,
and complexity, which is the heterogeneity of the environmental variables the market
players have to cope with. Over the years, researchers have investigated the
environment's impact on structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Norburn & Birley, 1988;
Karaevli, 2007), strategy (Miller, 1988; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000) and decision-making
processes (Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984; Priem et al., 1995; Baum & Wally, 2003;
Grag et al., 2003). The environment is one of the most important contingency variables
with which a firm has to contend (Tosi & Slocum, 1984, Goll & Rasheed, 2004). This
part of my study, explains why the different dimensions of environment as mentioned by
Dess and Beard (1984) are likely to moderate the relationships between a higher rate of
change in TMT composition and board structure and subsequent firm performance.
Dynamism refers to the stability of the environment the firm operates in. If
changes are taking place rapidly in the environment, strategic decision making is harder
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due to increased uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984). In turbulent environments, executives
are required to deal with constant change (Galbraith, 1973; Wholey & Brittain, 1989).
Once things become uncertain, it is harder for decision makers to effectively plan
(Aldrich, 1979). Managers operating in such environments are expected to implement
broader ranges of strategic options (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Karaevli, 2007).
Akgun, Keskin and Byrne (2007) show that emotional capability in innovative firms,
which may be a proxy for entrepreneurial efficacy in younger firms, is positively related
to firm performance and dynamism moderates this relationship such that the relationship
gets stronger under dynamic conditions. In parallel, the entrepreneurship literature shows
the moderating effect

of dynamic environments on the relationship between

entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). As
previously mentioned, executives of younger firms have limited resources and, as a
natural result of that, they have limited strategic options (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). So,
if the environment is dynamic, given the limited resources, it becomes even harder for
executives to perform their strategic decision making duties. Not surprisingly, researchers
have empirically demonstrated a negative relationship between firm performance and
dynamism (Bantel, 1998). In a more recent study, Ahmad, Ramayah, Wilson and
Kummerov (2010) investigate whether environmental stability moderates the positive
relationship between entrepreneurial competency and firm performance of small to
medium enterprises (SMEs). Entrepreneurial competency is defined as "underlying
characteristics such as generic specific knowledge, motives, traits, self-images, social
roles, and skills which result in venture birth, survival, and/or growth" (Bird, 1995:51).
Ahmad and his colleagues found that entrepreneurial competencies are positively related
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with firm performances of SMEs located in Malaysia, and under dynamic environmental
conditions, entrepreneurs minimize the negative effects of this dynamism so the
relationship between entrepreneurial competencies, which is similar to entrepreneurial
efficacy in young entrepreneurial firms, and firm performance gets even stronger. In the
case of younger firms, which face the vulnerabilities of liability of newness
(Stinchcombe, 1965), unstable environments may require the presence entrepreneurial
efficacy inherent with the original owners. If researchers have already considered the
importance of TMT routines with regard to performance and environment relationships
(Bourgeois, 1980, March, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), then it is logical to expect a
moderating impact of environmental dynamism on the relationship between the TMT
structure and firm performance. Within the context of this study, it is proposed that
dynamism will determine how detrimental the changes in the TMT structure will be on
firm performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is constructed:
H7: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such that
the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a higher
rate of change in TMT membership are on operating performance.
The same logic also applies to the complexity dimension of the environment. First
of all, complexity refers to the presence of heterogeneity in the environmental variables
(Child, 1972, Duncan, 1972). According to Dess and Beard (1984), once the environment
becomes more complex, it becomes harder for executives to perform their environmental
scanning duties and to acquire resources from beyond the borders of the organization.
Under complex conditions, firms have to cope with more inputs and outputs available in
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the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) which also increases
the need for well-structured strategies (Aldrich, 1979). For instance, Boyd (1995)
recommends the practice of CEO duality in highly complex environments, although a
long-term debate is ongoing among academicians about how effective duality is under
normal conditions (Desai, Kroll & Wright, 2003). Covin and Slevin (1989) argue that,
under hostile environmental conditions, which is the case in complex environments, firm
performance is positively related with strategic postures. "Strategic posture can be
broadly defined as a firm's overall competitive orientation. A firm's entrepreneurialconservation orientation is indicative of its strategic posture" (Covin & Slevin, 1989:77).
As discussed previously, a young small firm that just completed the IPO process is in
need of greater inputs from the original founder entrepreneurs. Just like the pre-IPO
success of the firm, the post-IPO success of the firm relies on how well they maintain
their entrepreneurial efficacy. Thus, just like dynamism, environmental complexity
should also behave as an interaction term on the relationship between the rate of change
in TMT structure and firm performance. In fact, there is empirical evidence suggesting
that environmental complexity moderates the relationship between strategy and firm
performance (McArthur & Nystrom, 1991). Assuming that the level of complexity
inherent in the environment remained constant from the pre- to post-IPO period, if the
previous strategies of the smaller firm, enacted by original TMTs taking environmental
complexity into consideration, were not working, it probably would not have been able to
make it to the IPO stage. Once it completes the IPO, the small firm still needs the tacit
knowledge provided by the original executives. For that reason, the following hypothesis
is proposed:
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Hs: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, such
that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher
rates of change in the TMT membership on operating performance.
The final dimension Dess and Beard (1984) mention is munificence.
Environmental munificence refers to the environment's ability to support sustained
growth (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997). "Munificent
environments support growth of resources within firms, providing a reserve against
competitive and environmental threats" (Baum & Wally, 2003:1110). Casrogiovanni
(1991:542) describes the lack or presence of munificence as "the scarceness or abundance
of critical resources needed by (one or more) firms operating within an environment."
Researchers acknowledge the fact that younger firms suffer from a lack of critical
resources (Zahra & Filatotchev, 1994). Operating under less munificent conditions makes
it even harder for such firms to function. In that case, the knowledge base provided by the
original executives becomes more critical to deal with external conditions. Once the
original structure is altered by the new owners, it is likely that the new executives will
diminish the firm's capacity to deal with the lack of munificence. That means
performance is likely to suffer. Goll and Rasheed (1997) find that rational decision
making is associated more strongly with performance under highly munificent
environments. Covin and Slevin (1989) associate munificence with benign environments
and propose that a conservative strategic posture (in contrast with an entrepreneurial
strategic posture) is needed for better performance under these conditions.
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In addition to their findings about complexity, McArthur and Nystrom (1991) also
demonstrate environmental munificence's moderating effect on the relationship between
strategy and firm performance. In munificent environments, executives can use more
discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987, Walters et al., 2010). In the case of young
entrepreneurial firms, more discretion is needed because the importance of making the
"right choice" is heightened (Slevin & Covin, 1997) due to the limited availability of
resources (Baum & Wally, 2003). Furthermore, it has been empirically found that
munificence has a direct effect on firm performance (Bantel, 1998). Based on this
discussion, environmental munificence may be expected to have a moderating effect on
the relationship between rate of change in TMT membership and firm performance. The
following hypothesis is constructed based on this expectation:
H9: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, such
that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a
higher rate of change in the TMT membership will be on operating performance.
Referring to the initial model regarding the series of relationships, as depicted in
Figure 1.1, the environment will not only have a moderating effect on the TMT structure
and firm performance relationship, but one may also expect it to influence the
relationship between board

composition

and firm performance.

Environmental

uncertainty is known to moderate the relationship between board composition and firm
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). It may not be necessary to repeat the theoretical
background regarding the board composition and firm performance relationship. As a
snapshot, researchers acknowledge the fact that the board of directors is one of the
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primary determinants of a firm's performance (Daily & Dalton, 1992). It has also been
proposed that directors are reflections of the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Boards can
provide the executives with new business concepts (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and expertise
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Furthermore, some researchers also propose that, in
smaller firms, it is better to retain the strategic decision making in the same individuals as
the dominant coalition, which is composed of not only executives but also the directors
(Certo et al., 2007), is more likely to positively affect firm performance if there is a
shared vision (Nelson, 2003; Walters et al., 2010). In summary, firms operating in
dynamic, complex and less munificent environments will need more input from their
directors. The question is, do the new directors appointed by the new owners help to
mitigate the agency problems as proposed by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
or does reconfiguring the original board yield lower performance in the case of young
entrepreneurial firms (Kroll et al., 2007)? Based on the underlying theme of this study,
the following hypotheses are tested to answer this question:
HJO: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such that
the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher
rates of change in board composition on operating performance.
Hn: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, such
that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher
rates of change in board composition on operating performance.
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H12: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, such
that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the effects of
higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance.
The next section summarizes the plan for addressing issues with regard to
methodology such as data sources and data collection, potential variables, statistical
methods and sample.

CHAPTER 3

SAMPLE AND METHODS
Sample
The sample that was used in this study was constructed using the SDC Database.
This database is used to construct samples in IPO studies (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003;
Kim, Pukthuanthong-Le, & Walker, 2008). IPO firms that went public between 2001 and
2005 were included in the study. The subsequent governance and accounting data was
collected for each company which means that years 2002 to 2010 were included in the
study (2002-2006 for companies that went public in 2001, 2003-2007 for companies that
went public in 2002, 2004-2008 for companies that went public in 2003, 2005-2009 for
companies that went public in 2004, 2006-2010 for companies that went public in 2005).
The reason to choose 2001 as the initial year for this study was to avoid the potential
impact of stock market fluctuations during 2000 (Walters et al., 2010). Also, focusing on
multiple years is likely to reduce the effects of macroeconomic conditions of a specific
year within the realm of my study (Nelson, 2003; Walters et al., 2010). Founding year of
the company was also taken into account. As previously mentioned, the focus in this
study was on young entreprenurial firms. Based on the literature, a firm is considered
young if it is founded within the previous ten-year period (Kroll et al., 2007). In that
regard, IPO firms that were founded in year 1991 and forward were included in this
study. By using this restriction, it is assumed that all the firms included in this study were
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still in their young entreprenurial phases (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Carpenter et
al., 2003). Financial sector companies, real estate funds and energy companies were
eliminated as the legal requirements for such firms are different than other types of firms
(Schnatterly, 2003).
The search on SDC database revealed that between Jan 1st 2001 and Dec 31 st
2005, there were 320 IPO firms that were founded within the previous ten-year period.
From that list, commercial banks, mutual funds, investment funds, credit agencies, real
estate funds and energy companies were eliminated. Companies that were part of parent
organizations, which were founded more than 10 years ago were also eliminated from the
sample. The final sample consisted of 185 young entrepreneurial firms.
Prospectus information that contained governance and performance data were
gathered from the SEC's Edgar database which is a popular source in IPO studies (Kroll
et al., 2007). The other data source that was used to determine IPO and subsequent stock
prices was the CRSP database. Accounting data was gathered from Research Insight and
Disclosers databases. These databases were also used to collect the environmental data.
In case there were any missing data, company websites were used as secondary data
sources. Corporate governance information was accessed through annual reports
published in the SEC Edgar Database and company websites.

Analytical Analysis
Variables
Dependent Variable
Firm Performance: A key dependent variable in this study was firm performance
as the main theme of this dissertation was to assess the impact of corporate governance
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changes following the IPO on firm performance. There are several performance variables
used in the literature. One group of researchers adopt stock-market-based performance
view (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009) and use variables tied to the stock performances of
companies, like holding period returns or stock price growth, while others decide to use
accounting-based measures (Morgan, Vorhies & Mason, 2009) such as return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) or return on sales (ROS). In this study, both types of
measures were used to measure firm performance. First, Tobin's Q was adopted as a
market-based performance measure following other corporate governance-performance
relationship based studies (Yermack, 1996; Wright et al., 2005; Orlando, Murthi & Kiran,
2007; King & Santor, 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). Data for estimating Tobin's Q
was collected from Compustat Research Insight Database. The calculation method
adopted in this study is consistent with the method developed by Chung and Pruitt
(1994). The formula is as follows:
Tobin 'sQ = (MV + PS + Debt) / TA.
MV refers to the total market value and is calculated by the product of a firm's
share price and the number of shares outstanding. PS (if applicable) is the value of the
preferred stock outstanding. Debt is the value of the firm's long-term debt and current
liabilities minus the current assets. Finally, TA is the book value of the total assets. This
estimation of Tobin's Q has been used in previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Wright et al.,
1996; Wright et al., 2005).
The accounting-based performance measure adopted in this study was return on
assets (ROA). ROA was calculated as net income divided by total assets. Rate of change
in blockholder ownership, rate of change in board membership and new executive
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appointees were also be used as dependent variables. Further information about them will
be provided in the next section.
Independent Variables
Underpricing: Several variables have been used in finance literature to predict
IPO performance. This study chose to employ underpricing as the primary determinant
variable.
Underpricing is defined as the difference between a firm's IPO issue price and its
first day closing price (Arthurs et al., 2008). The first day return, which was reported in
CRSP database, was used as a proxy for underpricing. If this variable's value is positive
then the IPO is successful from the company's standpoint in that investors initially paid
more money than the company is worth. If the situation is reversed it means the first day
closing price is higher than the initial offer price, so the company's shares were offered
at a price less than the market's imputed value of the firm, and the management has left
money on the table. When this happens, based on the arguments offered earlier,
subsequent changes are expected in ownership structure and corporate governance
mechanisms.
Rate of change in blockholder ownership: Blockholders are shareholders with five
percent or more of the firm's outstanding shares (Kroll et al., 1997). The way the rate of
change in blockholder ownership is operationalized is somewhat unique, but I believe is
consistent with the main theme of this study. First the number of blockholders at period t
is determined. Then, the number of blockholders at period t+ 1 is determined. In the next
step, the number of new blockholders emerged at period /+1 is identified. Finally, the
number of blockholders at /+1 is deducted from the summation of the number of
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blockholders at / and the number of new blockholders at t+l and then this value is
divided by the number of blockholders at t. The mathematical representation is as
follows:
Rate of change in blockholders t+\ = (number of blockholderst + number of new
blockholders,+\ -number of blockholderst+\)/number of blockholderst
By adopting this operationalization method, I considered replacement of original
owners with new ones to be detrimental for the fims rather than the new owners securing
controlling shares while the original owners are still in place.
TMT Membership: TMT membership is determined by looking at the prospectus
and proxy statements. If a person is listed in the top executive's list on the corresponding
document than he or she is considered a member of the top management team (Cohen &
Dean, 2005). These data was collected for the IPO date and the five years following the
IPO date. The rate of change methodology mentioned above could not be used to
calculate the rate of change in TMT since the data about executives reported in annual
proxy statements is not as reliable as it is for the members of the boards of directors. In
the next chapter, this is situation is demonstrated through an example. Instead of the rate
of change variable, I used the number of new executive appointees as a proxy for changes
in TMT.
Rate of change in board membership: Board membership is determined by
looking at the prospectus and proxy statements as well. If the person is listed as a director
then he or she is considered a member of the board. As with TMT membership, these
data was collected for the IPO date and the five years following the IPO date. The way
the rate of change variable is operationalized is very similar to the methodology adopted
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for calculating the rate of change in ownership structure. This time, number of directors
at period t+l is determined. In the second step, the number of new directors at period t+2
and the number of directors at t+2 are identified. The number of directors at t+2 is
deducted from the summation of the number of directors at t+l and the new number of
directors at t+l. The result is divided into number of directors at t+l to calculate the rate
of change. The mathematical representation is as follows:
Rate of change in directors t+2 = (number of directorst+\ + number of new directorst+2number of directors,+2)/number ofdirectorst+\
It should be noted, once the original directors are replaced by new directors, I
believe the entrepreneurial efficacy is diminished. The above method of calculating rate
of change accounts for that situation and is also consistent with the general theme of this
study.
Moderating Variables
Various dimensions of the external environment are moderating variables in this
study, as in earlier related studies (Walters et al., 2010). As mentioned before, according
to Dess and Beard (1984) there are three dimensions of environment.

These are

munificence, dynamism and complexity. Several methods have been used in the literature
to calculate these three variables (Walters et al., 2010). In this study, I chose to adopt the
methods used by Palmer and Wiesman (1999) to calculate the environmental complexity
variable. It is calculated by dividing the aggregate sales of the four largest firms in each
corresponding industry by the total sales of that industry where the industry is identified
by the three-digit SIC code. Industry concentration was used to account for
environmental dynamism. This variable was calculated by dividing the aggregate of the

65
sales figures reported for the four largest companies in an industry divided by the
aggregate sales of the industry from the prior two year period where industry is
determined by the four-digit SIC codes (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Finally,
environmental munificence was calculated by the average industry sales growth rate
during the five-year period where industry was once again determined by the four-digit
SIC codes (Wiersman & Bantel, 1993; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). All of the sales
values were gathered from the Compustat database.
Control Variables
Several control variables were included in this study. As investors may perceive
less risk associated with IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters (Carter, Frederick
& Singh, 1998) underwriter reputation is likely to affect IPO returns (Beatty & Ritter,
1986; Bruton et al., 2010). Carter et al. (1998) analyzed several measures of underwriter
reputation and concluded that all of them are correlated with IPO performance. Two
primary measures Carter and his colleagues specify are: the CM measure developed by
Carter and Manaster (1990), and the MW measure developed by Megginson and Weiss
(1991). This study adopted the CM measure, which uses the relative position of an
underwriter with the highest rating of nine. This data was readily available online at
Professor

Jay

Ritter's

web-site

(bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).

Demographic variables are known to impact firm performance (Cohen & Dean,
2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). For instance, researchers showed that demographic
variables like TMT and director age can determine the risk propensity of those
individuals (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In addition, education is shown to be positively
related with innovation capabilities of a firm (Bantel & Jackson, 1989), and industry
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experience is found to be positively related with organizational growth (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1990). All these variables were used as control variables in the below
mentioned models. The size of a firm is also likely to be a determinant factor of firm
performance and corporate governance practices (Dorata & Petra, 2008). Thus, firm size,
measured by the natural log of sales, was used as a control variable as it has been
included in previous studies (Miller, 1991; Carpenter, 2002). In order to account for
prior firm performance on IPO performance (Walters et al., 2010), return to shareholders
and return on assets were used as proxy variables (McDonald, Khanna & Westphal,
2008). Venture capitalist presence is known to lower initial returns of an IPO and
subsequent firm performance (Meggison & Weiss, 1991) and also likely to serve as a
signaling mechanism for publicly traded companies (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) so a
dummy variable was used to account for venture capitalist presence at the time of the
IPO. Number of executives and directors were used to account for possible effects for
TMT and board size on firm performance (Liu, Atinc & Kroll, 2011). Findings about
duality are inconsistent and the debate is going on for some time (Desai et al., 2003).
Some scholars found duality to be beneficial for firm performance (Davis, Shurman &
Donaldson, 1997; Braun & Sharma, 2007) while others recommend the separation of
chairman and chief executive positions (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In this study, duality is
controlled for and operationalized with a dummy variable. Although my sample is
composed of primarily American-based firms, there are also some foreign-based IPOs. In
order to account for possible effects of firm nationality (Bruner, Chaplinsky &
Ramchand, 2004), a dummy variable is used as a control variable. Finally, founder
effects on IPO performance and subsequent firm performance have been shown to be
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positive in previous studies (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). In
this study, presence of founder as a blockholder at the time of the IPO and as either as a
chairman or as a CEO during the post-IPO stage are used as control variables in various
models mentioned below.
Methods
The statistical methods to be used in this study are hierarchical linear regression
and ANOVA. Several different regression models were developed to test the previously
mentioned hypotheses. Below are these models:
Rate of change blockholder ownership^ i)= Po + P]Underpricing(f) + P2Firm Size + PsFirm
Nationality + P/fVenture capitalists presence + PsFounder Presence + PeUnderwriter
prestige
(Expected sign of Pi is + with statistical significance),
Number of new executive appointeeS(,+2) = Po + PiRate of change in blockholder
ownership(,+i) + P2Firm Size + PsFirm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance +
P6TMT size (Expected sign of PJ is + with statistical significance),
Rate of change in board membership^) = Po + PiRate of change in blockholder
ownership^]) + P2Firm Size + P3Firm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance +
PeBoard size
(Expected sign of Pi is + with statistical significance),
Number of new executive appointees(,+3) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors^)
+ P2Firm Size + PsFirm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance
(Expected sign of pi is + with statistical significance),
Tobin's Q(,+3) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(/+2)+ P2 Number of new
executive appointees (/+2) X dynamism(,+2) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+2)
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+2) X Munificence (/+2) +
PsFirm Size + P6Firm Nationality + PyDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + pioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
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R0A(,+3) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+2)+ P2 Number of new executive
appointees (,+2) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+2) X
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (/+2) X Munificence (/+2) +
PsFirm Size + PeFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and p3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
Tobin's Q(/+3) = Po + PjRate of change in board of directorS(,+2)+ P2Rate of change in
board of directors^) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors^) X Munificence (,+2) +
PsFirm Size + PeFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the chairman
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
ROA(,+3) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directorS(/+2)+ P2Rate of change in board of
directors(/+2) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directorS(/+2) X
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(,+2) X Munificence (,+2) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the chairman
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
Tobin's Q<y+4) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+3)+ P2 Number of new
executive appointees (,+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+3)
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X Munificence (,+3) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + Pi (Executives
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO,
ROA(,+4) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointees(,+3)+ P2 Number of new executive
appointees (,+3) X dynamism^+3) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X Munificence (,+3) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO,
Tobin's Q(/+s) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(/+4)+ P2 Number of new
executive appointees (,+4) X dynamism(,+4) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+4)
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) X Munificence (/+4) +
PsFirm Size + PgFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives
with advanced graduate degrees + p^Founder as the CEO
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
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ROA(,+5) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+4)+ P2 Number of new executive
appointees (,+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) X
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) X Munificence (,+4) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives
with advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the CEO
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance),
Tobin's Q0+4) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+3)+ P2Rate of change in
board of directorS(/+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors^) X Munificence (,+3) +
PsFirm Size + psFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman,
ROA(,+4) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+3)+ P2Rate of change in board of
directors(,+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(,+3) X Munificence (,+3) +
psFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + p9Percentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman,
Tobin's Q0+5) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+4)+ P2Rate of change in
board of directorS(<+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X
complexityo+4) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors(,+4) X Munificence (,+4) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman, and
ROA(,+5) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+4)+ p2Rate of change in board of
directors(/+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(*+4) X Munificence (,+4) +
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with
advanced graduate degrees + P ^Founder as the chairman.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION OF DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports the results of the empirical analysis. In the first section, the
descriptive statistics and correlations are reported together with information about the
sample. In the second part, results of several statistical procedures are presented for
hypotheses testing.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
Before getting into the details of the descriptive statistics, it may be useful to
provide some information about the sample. Table 4.1 is presented for this purpose. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, using the SDC Database, firms that went public in 2001-2005
were identified. Among those firms, only the ones that were founded within the 10-year
period prior to the IPO date were chosen as previous researchers had done (Kroll et al.,
2007). Among the 320 companies that were identified, commercial banks, mutual funds,
investment banks, investment funds, credit agencies, real estate funds, and energy
companies are eliminated as they are faced with unusual legal requirements of going
public owing to their operational and/or regulatory uniqueness (Schnatterly, 2003). The
companies that were part of parent organizations, which were founded more than 10
years ago, were also eliminated.
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Table 4.1 About the Sample

2001
2002
2003

Frequency
23
15
17

2004

81

43.8

2005
American

49
185

26.5
83.8

Foreign

39

16.2

126

70

76

41.1

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

0.000
0.160
1.200

100.000
90.070
88.900

74.030
40.170
33.750

1.000
1.000

89.300
87.900

26.680
21.420

1.000
1.000

92.400
92.600

19.200
16.130

85.670
14.000
17.000
Fifth
Year
5
6
3
14

1.920
7.220
6.160

Variable

I P O Year

Nationality
Venture Capitalist
Presence
Founder Presence

Percentage of outside directors
IPO
First Year
Percentage of
Second
shares owned by
Year
executives and
Third Year
directors
Fourth
Year
Fifth Year
First day Return
(underpricing)
Board Size I P O
T M T Size I P O
First
Year
Acquired
3
Merged
0
Delisted
0
Total
3

Second
Year
3
5
1
9

-22.670
2.000
2.000
Third
Fourth
Year
Year
8
7
4
8
2
8
14
23

Percent
12.4
8.1
9.2

Total
26
23
14
63

Percentage
14.1
12.4
7.6
34.1

Table 4.1 (Continued)
SIC CODE
2020
2329
2800
2834
2835
2836
2869
3272
3480
357 J
3572
3577
3589
3646
3651
3661
3672
3674
3690
3714
3812
3841
3842
3843
3845
3955
3990
4213
4400
4412
4512
4813
4822
4833
4899
5015

Frequency
1
1
1
26
2
4

2

18

11

4
6

Percent
0.5
0.5
0.5
14.1
1.1
2.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.6
0.5
9.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
5.9
0.5
0.5
2.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
2.2
0.5
3.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

SIC CODE
5031
5047
5065
5140
5511
5712
5812
5944
5947
5961
5984
7011
7200
7311
7319
7320
7361
7370
7371
7372
7373
7374
7375
7379
7380
7381
7389
7812
7990
8011
8062
8082
8200
8731
8734
8742

Frequency

2
2

5
15
5
4
1
2
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
2

Percent
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.1
1.1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
2.7
8.1
2.7
2.2
0.5
1.1
0.5
0.5
5.9
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.1
0.5
1.6
0.5
1.1

73

The final sample consisted of 185 companies. 12.4 percent of the companies in
my sample went public in 2001, while 8.1 percent in 2002, 9.2 percent in 2003, 43.8
percent in 2004 and 26.5 percent of the sample companies went public in 2005. Among
those companies, 155 (84 percent) were American based and 30 (16 percent) were
foreign based. Looking at industry representation, 72 different SIC codes are represented
with none of the industries representing more than 14.1 percent of the sample (SIC 2834Pharmaceautical Preparations represented 14.1 percent of the sample).
While the time span chosen for this study is 2001-2005, a significant number of
the companies that went public were not active for the whole five-year period (34.1
percent). Out of the 185 companies, 26 of them were acquired (14.1 percent) by another
company, 23 of them merged with another company (12.4) and 14 of them were delisted
voluntarily or due to bankruptcy (7.6 percent). Out of these 63 companies, 3 companies
(1.6 percent) in 2001, 9 companies (4.9 percent) in 2002, 14 companies (7.6 percent) in
2003, 23 companies (12.4 percent) in 2004 and 14 companies (7.6 percent) in 2005 got
acquired or were involved in merger or got delisted. Three companies were acquired
within the first year while none of the companies merged with another company or got
delisted during the first year. Although identifying the reasons behind why the firms were
acquired, merged or delisted is beyond the scope of this study, observing this many
companies being lost from the sample is worthy of note and warrants attention by future
researchers of this field.
Due to recent SEC regulations and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and exchange
listing requirements, publicly traded companies are now required to have at least 50
percent of their directors be independent outsiders (Peng, 2004). This explains why none

74

of the companies had less than 50 percent board vigilance. Surprisingly, the average
percentage of outside directors on the board was 74 percent. Almost 70 percent of the
companies had venture capitalist backing as shown in previous research (Bruton et al.,
2010) and 41 percent of the companies reported their founder to be a member of the
board of directors when the firm went public. The average percentage of shares owned by
current executives and directors declined from 40 percent at the IPO to 16 percent by the
fifth year following the IPO. This finding is similar to previous research (Certo, 2003)
and supports my proposal concerning changes in the ownership structure of IPO firms
following the IPO process. The average first day returns was 1.9 percent with a low of
22.7 percent loss and a maximum of 85 percent gain. The average board size was seven
directors and the average TMT size was six executives which also coincides with
previously conducted studies (Carpenter et al., 2003). I believe that all of the above
information can be considered as support for the reliability of the data collection
procedure. I now turn to a discussion of the descriptive statistics and correlations.
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations among the
variables included in this study. As seen from this table, there were 44 variables included
as dependent, independent or control variables in different ANOVA or ordinary least
square procedures. Starting with the first variable, return on first day trading, and the
mean value is 1.9 percent. Looking at the bivariate correlations of this variable with the
other variables, we observe that, change in ownership (/)=0.141,/?<.10), venture capitalist
presence (p=0A5S, p<.05), rate of change in blockholder ownership at /+1 (p=0.170,
p<.05), rate of change in board of directors at t+2 (p=0A33, p<A0) are positively related
with underpricing.

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
\ anable Name
Mean
1 Return on first day
0 01°20
(underpricing)
2 Change in"ownership
i
m i
(dummy)
3 firm Sl7e
10 5679b

SD
0 1178b

1

J ^0 27

14it

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

z 17751

076

106

4 Nationality ot the
tirm (dummy)
5 VC presence
(dummy)
6 Founder presence

0 8 784

o 36960

010

036

169

0 70f 10

0 4o9 0 4

158

Z5J

113

130

0 41081

0 49332

073

027

066

080

086

7 Underwriter prestige

~i 23340

3 41448

092

102

061

z54

324

047

170

778

193

- 108

155

004

- 058

0 24880

l"t

175

097

114

179

113

082
082

187

8 RC 111 blockholder
ownership (t+l)
9 Rate ot change in
directors (t+2)
10 Duality
11 ROA t+l
12 N u m b c r o f
Directors t+l
13 Number Of new
executive appointees
(t+2)
14 Number ot
Executives (IPO)
l i Number of new
executive appointees
(t+3)
16 Rate of change in
directors (t+l)
17 Rale of change 111
directors (t+3)
18 Rate ot change 111
directors (t+4)
19 Rate Of change 111
directors (t+5)
20 RC 111 blockholder
ovuurship (t+2)
21 RC 111 blockholder
ownership (t+3)
22 RC 111 (t+4)
blockholder
owntrship

0 20643
0 19180

0 25719

0 44809

0 4986o

080

00^

0o2
0o2

106
-- 106

028
028

-17 0z340

10 30681

047

- 015

z24
-- z24

^ 3j519

1 72556

025

015

506
506
zl9
zl9

100
- 100
121

1 12644

1 22408

020

070

163

007

6 15847

z 32805

001

036

137t

1 29375

1 371 6

071

058

0 10526

0 16196

058

0 1 ^59

0 30577

2716

0 22014

0

9

023
023

138t

9

176 -- 013
013
176

068

- 063

085
085
249
249

062
062
z02
z02

088

- 014

101

097

029

10

11

12

13

14

15

041

125t

135t

032

- 118

047

044

096

062

138t

024

- 047

- 016

033

192

122

- 033

161

- 033

z00

184

065

002

098

080

1541

085

079

130

zOl

159

zl5

- 083

086

037

027

082

247

185

022

139t

093

- 204

115

064

012

008

0o7

048

164

- 116

040

053

049

- 012

- 017

005

- 007

- 079

072

0 320^0

082

- 130

- 199

023

038

03b

230

- 065

019

115

283

021

029

090

- 008

0 33166

071t

107

- 141

010

117

029

- 006

108

052

- 012

- 094

157t

095

054

112

0 36344

0 312b2

005

193

- 0 j

- 033

163

034

075

132t

186

- 023

022

- zOO

042

138t

070

0 3^834

0 34014

135t

12J

095

083

138

022

- 090

137t

009

068

- 003

- 075

053

018

- 025

0 364o9

0 32115

014

047

128

042

zll

- 035

019

032

110

- 111

076

- 113

133

241

055

-J
'Si

Table 4 2 (Continued)
Variable Name
23 RC in blockholder
ownership (t+5)
24 Number of new
executive appointees
(t+D
25 Number of new
executive appointees
(t+4)
26 Number of new
executive appointees

Mean
0 39042

S_D
0 33207

1
051

2

3

4

5

065

034

148

035

0 7^770

l 19387

031

121

045

085

001

025

1 93617

3 1343

- 082

025

158t

1 ?0 93 - 0z3

076

147

0 °«^61

-

6
-

006

7

8

9

007

029

005

186

224

•-

-

10

11
•-

12

13

14

045

011

009

085

458

141t

170t

-

021

008

0^8

-

017

069

-

-

15
-

046

776

-

Ill

108

098

015

144 t

085

zl9

125

105

097

356

z47

-

004

040

030

021

136

103

102

084

024

060

294

(t+5)

N=l2s I 8 3 i < l 0 *p< 0b **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the analyses

Variable Name
77 l o b i n s O t

i

Mean

SD

3

6 143

22D

78 T o b m s Q t+4

z 467

79

1 93j

lobinsQt+j

184
1

364

1
0 02-5

0 087

0 070
-0

3

2
0

4
0 094

128

5

6

8

7

0 050

0 002

0 043

0 007

155 +

0 004

0 124

-

201*

0 171 +

0 065

0 035

109

0 001

0 150t

0 044

0 126

0 014

0 121

0 075

344* + -0

002

0 107

0 100

0 109

006

0 044

368** -0

040

0 136 +

0 024

0 100

0 097

0 034
0 008

0 014

0 022

1 ROA t+4

19

976

<. 0 COS

0 044

0 0oD

252*

0 109

0 104

0 133

0 006

0 031

ROA t+5

37

421

136

187

0 1">0

0 068

303**

0 140

0 053

0 102

0 021

z 737

b6 0 0 9

0 042

0 006

132

0 003

0 078

0 028

1 688

0 314

0 049

0 091

0 1,90

0 026

120

0 859

0 348

0 09^

0 3 0

0 471

168

i

0

-0

020

-0

016

0 072

0 478

0 1 90

0 002

0 026

0 042

3 047

0 028

0 114

0 799

0

060

0

z49

-0

013

*

059

1J6

0 094

0 088

0 116

097

0 026

033

0 066

0 058

199**

0 131t

-

131+
z00**

-0
0

-0

z26* + -0

-0

103

-0

0 025

0 002

-0

-0

013

0 083

0 079
0 07o

28

108

-0

0 149 +

0 025
0 051

0J3

-0

0 041

0 094

OJJ

15
0 160 +

198 +

155*

-0

086

z8S**

0 048

Oil

14

154 + - 0

-0

z25

0 044

D

13

072

z29 + *

1 6 477

a q 867

12

0 073

906

Slmeholdei Return
Men
4 P c i c t n t i 0 e ot
dneclois with poor
industiy cxpenence
35 A \ e n b c ol i ^
dtiectots
6 education
prestige (dnectois)
37 Foundei
C l n u n n n (dummy)
38 hn\ nonmentil
Dymmism
39 Ens iionmentTl
Complexity
40 Zn\ nonmentil
munificence
41 Percentile of
executives with
pnor mdustiy
expenencc

11
z83* + -0

0 057

n

roni

10
0 097

034

0 ROA t

V

9
0 088

059

-0

zl2** -0
062

026
o0 +

248 + *

-0

-0

0 109
-0

153 +

-0

010

o :155 +

0 075

647**

015

-0

001

189*

0 096

163*

-0

009

-0

004

0 072

-0

056

0 022

0 131 +

-0

048

-0

030

097

0 049

0 059

0 023

0 049

0 097

-0

-0

193**

0 033
-0

137

-0

090

0 060

-0

073

0 115

0 108

-0

099

053

-0

052

0 087

0 017

0 065

0 036

0

00

0 120

0 024

0 091

133 + -0

099

0 029

-0

051

0 071

-0

004

053

-0

-0

078
195**

0 049

-0

136 +

006

-0

-0

-0

-0

0 001

0 046

0 056

0 083

0 046

06°

058

0 029

003

-0

-0

061

-0

0 118

056

-0

0 059

00J

366**

036

0 087

-0

-0

04s

0 074

-0

0 036
-0

176*

007

513**

0 040

0 019
-0

141 +

0 004

-0

026

-0

004

-0

073

-0

014

-0

103

-0

049

-0

042

-0

075

154* -0

081

-0

035

-0

060

^1

ox

Table 4.2 (Continued)
Variable N a m e
Mean
42 Ave;age age ot
44.74 2
executives
43 Fducalion
° . 832
piestige (executives)
44 Foundei CEO
C .34 4
(dummy)

SD
6.866

1
-.1^8*+

0.371

0.082

0.070

-.224*+

•0.080

0.177

0.097

0.0*7

-.169*

-.178*

2
-0.074

-0.098

.230*+

-0.065
.183*
-0.066

-.199++
0.110
.469+*

1C
-0.008

11
-.253**

12
.169*

14
-0.047

13
0.017

-0.100

-0.060

-0.045

0.005

0.030

0.051

-.179*

0.045

0.042

-0.072

-0.020

-0.060

.320*

0.091

-.164* -0.095

0.135t

15
-.254**

.150*
-0.028

0.042
-0.139t

N = 1 2 5 - 1 8 5 t < 10. */;< 0 5 . **/?< 01 V a r i a b l e s are p r e s e n t e d in t h e o r d e r they a p p e a r in t h e a n a l y s e s
17

Variable N a m e
45 Rate of change m dnectois (t+l)
46 Rate of change in directors ( ^ 3 )

•0.0781

47 Rate ot change in directois (t-*-4)

0.133

48 Rate of change in directors (t+5)

0.058

0.007

0 .. 0 9 2

49 RC in blockholdei ownership (t+2)

0.120

-0.051

- 0 ..048

50 RC m blockholder ownership (t-^3)

-0.007

0.116

.158'

0.140

51 RC in blockholdei owneiship (t+4)

•0.042

0.035

.182

0.067

52 RC in blockholdei owneiship (t J -5)

0.069

-0.072

0 .. 0 4 6

-0.081

- 0 ..074

5^ Nunibet of new executive appointees (t+1)

.340++

18

19

0.031

0.060
0.1471
.171*

.201*

.408**

0.1581

0.1591

.195 +

0.122

0.083

0.105

-0.096

-0.130

-0.007

0.007

0.063

0.056

0.079

0.060

-0.068

0.078

-0.145

-0.027

-0.128

-0.081

0.100

54 Numbci of new executive appointees (t+4)

0.057

0.075

0 .032

55 Number of new executive appointees (t+5)

0.013

0.064

0 .032

56 T o b m s Q H 3

0.001

-0.1371

-0 .032

•0.109

57 Tobin's Q t+4

0.056

-0.134

- 0 ..088

-.183*

-0.040

0.073

0.002

-0.069

0.119

-0.122

0.024

58 T o b m s Q t+5

0.027

-0.088

- 0 ,.042

0.0^5

-0.033

0.123

-0.056

-0.040

.212

-0.122

0.054

50 ROA t+3

0.020

0.010

- 0 ..022

0.031

-0.039

0.101

-0.060

0.098

0.033

0.107

0.093

60 ROA 1+4

0.031

0.038

0.034

0.054

0.103

-0.028

0.061

0.045

0.127

0.112

6! ROA 1+5

0.005

0.040

0.037

0.058

0.148

0.139

-0.089

0.053

0.106

0.048

62 lotal Shareholdei Return 1 Year

0.066

-0.090

- .205
-.. 3 3 3
-.. 2 3 8

0.050

0. 118

-0.070

-0.1551

0.085

-0.011

-0.084

0.057

-0.033

-0 .098

-0.048

0.051

-0.105

0.028

-0.104

-0.074

-0.118

-0.036

0 .089
0 .034

•0.051
•0.022

-0.051

0.056

-0.105

-0.025

-0.061
-0.074

0.134

0.091

-0.012

0.108

0.106

0.091

-.189*

-0.022

0.078

0.125

63 Peicentagc of directois with prioi industiy expenence
64 A\ eiage ot age directois

•0.073
-.203+*

65 Education piestige (dnectois)

0.1261

0.000

66 Founder Chaiiman (dummy)

0.052

-0.1311

67 E m u o n m e n t a l Dynamism

•0.074

68 En\ uonmental Complexity
69 Fnviionmental munificence

0.032

0.120

.295**

0.1511

. 185*

-0.1521

0.040
.307 +

-.220*

-0.096

-0 .073

0.046

-0.047

-0.009

0.072

0 .008

•0.087

-0.089

-0.102

-0.043

-0.142

-0.017

0.041

0.033

- 0 . 1 4 41

0 .044

0.016

-0.035

-0.052

-0.029

0.069

-0.024

-0.157

0.140

•0.038

0.084

0 .020

-.183+

-0.066

0.045

-0.058

-0.009

0.004

-0.040

-0.002

0.1271
-0.049

0 .047
.181

•0.005
0.022

0.060
-0.010

0.068
-0.072

-0.099
0.136

0.004
-0.091

0.124

0.093

0.089

0.025

-.174
-0.086
.182

-0.080

-0 .056

-0.004
-0.016
0.054

0.047

0.030

-0.114
0.070
-0 .060
7"^ Founder CEO (dummy)
N - 1 2 5 - 1 8 5 | < 10, *p< 05. **p< 01 Variables aie presented in the order they appear in the analyses

0.039

-0.017

0.009

-.210*

-0.133

0.024

0.151

0.005

70 Peicentage ol executives with prioi industry e x p e n e n c e --.. 114
4 99*
•0.121
71 A \ e i a g e age of executives
0.064
72 Education piestige (executives)

0.102

-.180*

-.234*

.213*

-J

Table 4.2 (Continued)
Variable Name

27

29

28

30

31

32

34

33

35

37

36

38

39

40

74 Tobin's Q t+3
75 Tobin's 0 t+4

.226**

76 T o b m s Q t+5

0.103

77 ROA t+3

-.909**

0.002

.635**
0.033

78 ROA t+4

-.669**

0.049

-0.017

79 ROA t+5

0.003

0.018

-0.054

80 1 olal Shareholder Return 1 - 0 . 1 1 2
Year
81 Percentage ol directors with - 0 . 0 4 0
prior industry experience

0.059

-0.016

-0.020

0.004

0.000
-0.077

.764*
0.093

.373**

.189*

. 172*
-0.047

-0.126
-.195*

0 037
-0

005

0 071

-0

099

0 129 +

0.010

-0.059

0.116

-0.113
83 Education prestige
(directors)
84 Founder Chairman (dummy) - 0 . 0 0 7

0.078

0.041

0.147+

0.106

-0.076

0.056

0.006

0.057

0.090

0.048

0 041

-0

059

-0

114

85 Fnvironmcntal Dynamism

0.041

0.019

-0.045

0.013

0.014

0.002

-0

012

-0

015

-0

026

-0

062

86 Environmental Complexity

0.076

0.107

0.087

-0.027

0.042

0.032

-0

007

-0

133 + - 0

075

-0

099

82 Average oi age directors

-0.138+

0.087

87 Environmental munificence - 0 . 0 5 7

. 175*

0.099

0.055

-0.043

-0.071

88 Percentage of executives
with prior industry experience

-0.051

-.205*

-0.024

-0.017

-0.092

-0.096

89 Average age ot executives

-0.020

-0.160+

-0.038

-0.066

-0.104

90 Education prestige
(executives)
91 Founder CEO (dummy)

-.172*
-0.012

0.088

0.089

.163*

0.102

0.149+

-0

0 069

0 059

0 028

-0.025

0 045

0 119

0.046

0.064

0 040

-0

019

174*

0 030

297**

019

0.093

0.047

-.253**

0 067

-

-0

0 068

0 129 +
-0

003

0 012

0 101
0 031

-0

005

-0

014

-0

481** -0

083

-0

120

-0

205**

568**

0 038

-

151*

-

0 085

112

0 112

593**

-0.121

002

-.217**

014

-0.029

211**

-0.136+

0 116

-0.023

0 021

0 079

0 058
-0 063

N= 125-185 1< 10, *p< 05, **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the an alyses

Variable Name
92 Average age ot executives

41
. 186*

93 Fducalion prestige (executives)-O . 0 4 7
94 Founder CEO (dummy)

-0.007

42

43

44

-0.137+
- . 2 3 C **

0 .095

N=125-I85 f< 10 *p< 05 **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the analyses
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Interestingly, we do not observe statistically significant bivariate correlations
between this variable and firm size, board size, TMT size, rate of change in blockholder
ownership in subsequent periods and firm performance. This means that the completion
of the IPO process affects changes in firm governance mechanisms primarily in the first
period following the IPO. Considering the series of interrelated relationships originally
proposed, the lack of bivariate correlations between underpricing and the variables
mentioned is not surprising and is in line with my original contentions. On the other
hand, statistically significant relationships are observed between underpricing and the
founder as the chairman dummy (/?=0.168, p<.05) and the average age of executives (p=0.198, p<.0l). These findings are in parallel with the contentions of the signaling model
(Leland and Pyle, 1977).
One other surprising finding, as far as the bivariate correlations are concerned, is
the negative relationship between market based and accounting based measures. One
would expect these two measures to be highly and positively related. That was not the
case with the data collected for this study. This situation, once again, highlights the
uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms and the need to adopt different methods when
analyzing them (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Kroll et al., 2007). I believe that,
during the first few years, following the IPO, these companies are struggling to build
healthy accounting systems while coping with the extensive attention paid to them by the
market players. Some researchers refer to this situation as "liability of newness"
(Stinchcombe, 1965) while I consider that to be a limited explanation. Another possible
extension of this study is to investigate that process. In a recent study, Walters et al.
(2010) used sales growth as a measure of firm performance along with return on assets.
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Referring to previously conducted studies (Florin, Lubatkin, and Schulze, 2003), those
authors propose that sales growth may be the most telling measure of performance during
the initial years of a firm's existence. In this study, the firm size variable is measured by
log of sales and the three dimensions of environment are determined by the variations in
sales at the industry level. Thus, using sales growth as a performance measure could have
inflated the explanatory power of the independent variables (firms size and the interaction
effect would have explained most of the variance). Besides, as mentioned previously, a
significant portion of the companies in my sample did not survive the entire five-year
period, which means that for those companies sales growth figures either could not be
calculated or only reflects the growth in one calendar year.
The relationship between education prestige and average age of directors and
executives is also worthy of noting. The average age of directors has a negative bivariate
relationship with the "directors with advanced graduate degrees" dummy (p=-0A74,
p<.05). The same case is true for the relationship between the average age of executives
and "executives with advanced graduate degrees" dummy (p=-0A38, p<A0). The
importance of education in executive decision-making is documented in past (Vance,
1966) and recent (Roglio & Light, 2009) studies. It seems getting an advanced graduated
degree, such as MBA, is getting more and more popular among the executives and
directors. The potential impact of education in the case of young entrepreneurial firms
should also be investigated in future extensions of this study.
Finally, the relationships between venture capitalist presence and other variables
need further explanation. As can be seen from Table 4.2, the venture capitalist presence
dummy is positively related with underwriter prestige (p=0.324, p<.0l) and education
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prestige of executives (y9=0.183, /?<.05). It also has a positive relationship between the
rate of change in blockholder ownership (p=0A55,p<.05), the rate of change in directors
(p=0A79,p<.05) and the number of new executive appointees (p=0A37, p<A0). It seems
venture capitalists are likely to affect how the young entrepreneurial firms go through the
IPO process, how they are governed and how they perform in the future as documented in
previous studies (Dushnitsky and Shapira, 2010). The potential detrimental effects of that
in the case of young entrepreneurial firms still needs further attention. For instance,
should the contentions of this study prove true, the presence of venture capitalists may
not be that beneficial after all. In other words, venture capitalists may be the type of
owners that interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms of these firms. While
the researchers report that most firms go through the IPO process with venture capitalists
(Ritter, 1991), the performance of those that do not should be investigated in detail.

Hypotheses Testing
Several tables are constructed to report the results. Table 4.3 reports the results of
an ANOVA procedure that assesses the differences in first day returns for companies that
experience ownership change during the first year after the IPO. As can be seen, the
difference between the mean values of the first day returns among the firms that
experienced ownership change during the first year after the IPO and the firms that did
not is marginally significant (F=3.511,/K.10). Looking at the details, it can be seen that
the mean value of first day return for firms that experienced ownership change during the
first year after the IPO is higher than that of the firms that did not experience ownership
change (0.0314673 vs. -.0000421). This finding is parallel with previous findings
(Stoughton and Zechner, 1998) and in line with Hypothesis 1.

Table 4.3 ANOVA Results
Variable

Return on fust day
(undeipi icing)

N
Owneiship
change
No owneiship
change

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Source of Variation

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F
3.511t

86

-0.0000421

0.09128285

Between Groups

0.044

l

0.044

90

0 0314673

0 12787505

Within groups

2.164

174

0.012

Dependent variable is whether there is blockholder ownership change ' N=176 x< 10 *p< 05, **p< 01

OO
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To further investigate this finding, I created an ordinary least squares model
where the dependent variable was the rate of change in blockholder ownership. It should
be noted that the rate of change variable was not constructed to look solely at new owners
coming in but to identify the situations when old owners are replaced by new ones.
The way the rate of change was operationalized is consistent with my initial
proposal

regarding

interference

with

the

entrepreneurial

efficacies

of young

entrepreneurial firms. In other words, as long as the pre-IPO blockholders are in place,
they continue to provide their input to the firm, but changes in ownership become
detrimental when old owners are replaced with new ones, who have limited knowledge of
the company, take controlling positions. With that in mind, the results of Model 1 are
reported on Table 4.4. Hierarchical linear regression is used to see whether underpricing
of the IPO is a determining factor in subsequent changes in blockholder ownership. First,
the control variables are entered. Among the control variables (firm size, nationality of
the firm, venture capitalist's presence, underwriter prestige and presence of founder at the
IPO), firm size (P=0.238,/?<.01) and venture capitalist presence ((3=0.229, p<.0l) proved
to be significantly related to the rate of change in blockholder ownership at t+l time
period. In other words, the larger the firm and greater the presence of venture capitalists
at the time of the IPO (t), the more likely are young entrepreneurial firms to observe new
owners replacing the original owners. Although I will be explaining the implications of
this finding in the discussion section, at this point I observe that, it makes both theoretic
and intuitive sense to observe such relationships (i.e. venture capitalists are likely to sell
their shares after the IPO). In the second part of this model, the first day return variable is
added.

Table 4.4 Regression Results
Stepl
Standardized coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Venture capitalist presence
Founder presence
Underwriter prestige
Return on first day (underpricing)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value

Step 2
Standardized coefficients

3.084

-0.052

-0.658

t-value
-0.665

-0.833
0.238**

VTF

2.995

1.071

-0.052

-0.653

1.135
1.176

0.228**

0.229**

2.855

0.209

2.587

0.032

0.424

0.021

0.784

1.037

-0.119

0.150

-0.125

-1.521

1.212

0.127t

3.519**

3.430**

0.099

0 . 114

1. 671

1.041

0.015t
2.082

Dependent variable is "Rate of change in blockholder ownership ,+i,'' N=I67. | < 10. *p<.05: **p<01
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The relationship between the rate of change at t+l and the first day return of
young entrepreneurial firms in my sample (t) came out to be positive and significant
(P=0.127, p<A0). These results tell us that, the greater the underpricing of an IPO, the
greater the subsequent rate of change in ownership. Once again, this is in line with the
signaling model and is consistent with Hypothesis 1. As I mentioned previously, the
implications of these findings will be further discussed in the discussion section. After
the initial IPO performance, which was shown to influence the subsequent ownership
change, I proposed that changes in corporate governance mechanisms of firms are likely
to be observed. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 are constructed to show those results. Once
again, hierarchical regression models were used to check whether rate of change in
blockholder ownership (t+l) influenced the rate of change in directors (t+2) and the new
number of TMT members. Several things should be noted here. First, the way the rate of
change in blockholder ownership was operationalized was very similar to the way the
rate of change in boards of directors is operationalized. This time, replacement of original
directors with new ones, rather than solely adding more directors to the board was
considered. Hence, if the original directors were still active on the board, they were still
capable of providing their input as Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest. On the other
hand, several issues arose regarding TMT membership during the data collection. Unlike
the information reported for individual board members, most companies do not report
background information on all of the members of their TMTs (except for the IPO period).
Even if they occasionally do, the data on number of TMT is not reliable. For instance,
one company reported information for 11 executives in the prospectus but only reported
information for five executives in the proxy statement of the next year.

Table 4.5 Regression Results

Standardized

coefficient

Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm

t-value

-0.160*

0.760
-2.040

Duality

-0.073

0.347

Firm Performance

-0.055

-0.608

Board Size

Standardized

coefficients

0.141t

1.762

Rate of change in blockholder ownershipt+i

0.505

1.485

-0.152t

-1.948

1.073

-0.082

-1.074

1.036

-0.618

1.417

0.128

1 . 614

1.117

0.155*

2.

1.048

0.046

-.0550

Model F-value

2.214t

2.554*

R-Square

0.064

0.086

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value
0.675

0.625
0.700

VIF

Step 2

Stepl

012

0.023*
2.158

Dependent variable is "Rate of change in board ot directors 1+2,' N=169, t< 10. */J<.05; **/J<.01
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Table 4.6 Regression Results
Step 1
Standardized coefficient

t-value

Step 2
Standardized coefficients

VIF
t-value

Constant
Firm Size

0.132

1.450

0.161t

1.758

1.390

Nationality of the firm

0.017

0.206

0.009

0.114

1.062

Duality

0.051

0.645

0.059

0.451

1.012

Firm Performance
TMT Size

0. 031

0.336

0.029

0.320

1.351

0. 106

1.337

0. 108

1.373

1.022

0. 866

Rate of change in blockholder ownership,+!
Model F-value
R-Square

-0.187

-0.158*

1.299

1.767

0.040

0.064

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is Number of new executives 1+2 N=169 •]•< 10 *p< 05. **p< 01

0. 024*
2.190

-1.996

1.

042
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Among these five executives, two were newly appointed. Once I checked the
proxy statement of the third year, I observed that some of the original executives who
were not reported in the previous proxy statement were still working for the company
together with the newly appointed ones. Due to such complexities and lack of data, I
chose to use the number of new executives as a proxy for change in TMT membership.
Although the reliability of such a measure is questionable, I believe I am able to assess
the impact of changes in ownership on one of the mechanisms of corporate governance
(TMT membership) using this variable.
With this in mind, the results in Table 4.4 imply that there is a positive
relationship between the rate of change in board membership at t+2 and the rate of
change in blockholder ownership at /+1. In column one, two of the control variables (firm
size, nationality of the firm, duality, firm performance and board size at t+l) came out to
be significantly related with rate of change in board membership. The nationality dummy
variable was negatively related to rate of change in board membership (P=-0.160, p<05).
Considering the difference in corporate governance traditions of American firms and
international firms, this finding was expected. Board size was also positively related to
the rate of change in boards of directors (P=0.141, p<.10). One thing to note is that prior
performance (ROA at /+1) was not related to replacement of old directors with new
directors (P=-0.055, p>A0). In the following pages, I will be reporting the results of
subsequent firm performance reflecting changes in corporate governance mechanisms.
Observing a non-significant relationship between prior firm performance and subsequent
rate of change in board membership at this point tells us that, if I observe an impact on
firm performance during the third year following the IPO, it is not because of how these
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firms perform in prior periods (i.e. /+1) but it is due to intervention in the corporate
governance mechanisms of young entrepreneurial firms during the second year following
the IPO.
As can be seen in step 2, the rate of change in blockholder ownership at t+l was
positively and significantly related to rate of change in boards of directors at t+2
(P=0.155, p<.05). Hence, the replacement of original blockholders at t+l due to IPO
performance has a subsequent impact on replacement of original directors with new ones
at t+2. This finding supports Hypothesis 3. Results show that, if new owners take
controlling positions in these young entrepreneurial firms, they are likely to interfere with
one of the corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors). The importance of this
finding will be further discussed.
The second type of corporate governance mechanism I investigate in this study is
the rate of change in TMT membership. As I mentioned above, the proxy variable I
choose to adopt is the number of new executives appointed as part of the TMT. The
methodology adopted for analyzing the relationship between rate of change in directors
and ownership was also adopted for this process. First, the control variables were added.
Once again, firm size, nationality of the firm, duality, number of blockholders and
previous year firm performance were used as control variables. Unlike the model that
employed the rate of change in board of directors at t+2 as the dependent variable, the
overall model did not prove to be significant (F=1.299,/?>.10). Looking at the individual
coefficients, none of the control variables are significantly related with to dependent
variable.
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In the second step, the focal variable, rate of change in blockholder ownership at
/+1 was added to the model. In contrast to my expectations, rate of change in blockholder
ownership at t+l had a negative impact on the number of new executives at t+2 (P=0.158, p<.05). Although the overall model is still not significant (F=T.767, P>.10) for the
second year, controlling for firm size, nationality of the firm, presence of duality, number
of blockholders (t+l) and firm performance (t+l), when original blockholders are
replaced by new ones at t+l period, the number of new executives appointees declines.
Considering the positive relationship observed between the rate of change in boards of
directors at t+2 and the rate of change in blockholders at t+l, this finding is worthy of
note. It seems once the new owners take controlling positions in young entrepreneurial
firms they are more likely to interfere with the structure of the board of directors rather
than that of the TMT. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Before considering the impact on firm performance, I also needed to investigate
whether the changes in TMT were due to changes in boards of directors. Referring back
to the bivariate correlations on Table 4.2 between the rate of change in boards of directors
at t+2 and the number of new executives at t+3 time period, there was a positive
correlation between the two (p=0.154, /?<. 10). Obviously, this correlation value does not
indicate causality. However, it is an indication of some form of relationship between
these two variables. To further explore this relationship, a regression model was
estimated. As can be seen on Table 4.7, among the four control variables chosen for this
model (firm size, nationality of the firm, duality and previous year firm performance)
firm size and the firm nationality dummy were significantly related to the number of new
executives at t+3.

Table 4.7 Regression Results
Stepl
Standardized coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

VIF

Step 2
t-value

Standardized coefficients

t-value
1.025

1 . 122
0.188*

2.055

0. 176t

1.902

1.372

Nationality of the firm

-0.178*

-2.192

-0.164t

-1.977

1.106

Duality

-0.115

-1.455

-0.106

-1.326

1.026

Firm Performance

-0.045

-0.484

-0.037

0:69

1.375

0. 844

1.

Rate of change in board of directorst+2

0. 069

Model F-value

3.126*

2.638*

R-Square

0.078

0.082

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

084

0.004
2.036

Dependent variable is "Number of new executives,+,."' N=l 53, t< 10, *p<.05\ **p<01

*>o
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The relationship between firm size and the dependent variable was positive
(P=0.188, _p<.05) which means that larger firms are more likely to experience new
appointees to the TMT. Furthermore, there was a negative relationship between the
nationality dummy and number of new executive appointees at t+3 (P=-0.178, p<.05).
When the rate of change in boards of directors at t+2 was added to the model, contrary to
my expectations, the relationship between that variable and the number of new executive
appointees at t+3 was not statistically significant (P=0.069, _p>.10). This result suggests
new executive appointees in young entrepreneurial firms do not result from changes in
boards of directors when firm size, firm performance, firm nationality and presence of
duality are controlled. It is important to note that, while the number of international firms
in my sample is limited, at least for the third year, American companies are less likely to
experience new executive appointees relative to international firms. In order to
investigate this issue, I conducted an ANOVA test with which I compare the number of
new executive appointees at t+l, t+2, t+3, t+4 and M-5 for American vs. international
companies. As Table 4.8 shows, the mean values of number of new executives during the
third, fourth and fifth years were statistically different among American and international
companies.
Since the same situation does not apply to the rate of change in boards of
directors and blockholders for any of these periods, one wonders why this is the case. The
answer, I believe, is the differences in firm size. As can be seen in Table 4.8, on average,
among the firms in my sample, foreign firms are larger than American firms (F=5.346,
p<05).

Table 4.8 ANOVA Results
N

Vauable

New executive appointees (t+5)
Fnm Size

df

Mean Squaie

F

1

0 . 044

1 322

181

0.012

1

0.044

172

0.012

1

0.044

Between Gioups

30

0 . 97

1.299

Within gioups

1.13

1.133

Between Groups

28

1 . 11

1.244

Within gioups

133

1 . 18

1.302

Between Gioups

27

1.85

1.586

Within gioups

289.077

158

0.012

116

1.03

1.071

Between Groups

531.923

1

0.044

Foieign

25

6.12

3.032

Within groups

352.502

139

0.012

Ameucan

98

0.84

1.164

Between Gioups

1

0.044

Foieign

24

1.58

1.213

Within gioups

165.221

120

0.012

154

10.43

2.216

Between Gioups

24.759

1

29

1 1 . 43

1.758

Within gioups

Foieign

Foicign

Foieign
Ameucan

New executive appointees (t+4)

Sum ot Squares

1. 171

Ameucan
New executive appointees (t+3)

Souice of Vauation

0 . 69

Ameucan
New executive appointees (t+2)

Standard Deviation

153

Ameucan
New executive appointees (t+l)

Mean

Ameucan
Foieign

Dependent variable is Nationality of the firm

146

N=l 13-183 f< \0 *p<05

1.881
257.529
0.012
259.206
10.117

1 0 . 746

838.206

181

24.759

0 008

5 530*

209 7 5 0 * *

7 805**

5 346*

4. 631

* *p< 01
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Thus, the statistical difference between American and foreign firms with regard to
the number of new executive appointments at t+3 (F=5.530, p<.20), t+4 (F=209.750,
p<.01) and t+5 (F=7.805,/?<.01) can be attributed solely to firm size. This is in parallel to
the statistically significant coefficient of firm size in the above mentioned regression
model where number of new executives is the dependent variable.
Another regression model was employed to look at the effect of changes in
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in order to assess the final part of
the interrelated relationships initially proposed. Two sets of performance measures were
used. First, Tobin's Q, a market based measure, was used. Hypotheses 5 and 6 propose
that, changes in corporate governance mechanisms in young entrepreneurial firms will
result in lower performance. To find support for that proposition, Model 5 (Table 4.9)
was constructed. In this model, firm size, nationality of the firm (dummy variable),
presence of duality (dummy variable), total shareholder returns for 1 year (as a proxy for
prior performance), percentage of directors with industry experience, average age of
directors,

directors with advanced degrees (dummy variable) and founder as the

chairman (dummy variable) were used as control variables, Tobin's Q at t+3 was the
dependent variable and the rate of change in board of directors at t+2 was the
independent variable. First, the control variables were added. None of the control
variables were observed to be significantly related with Tobin's Q at t+3. The sign of the
coefficient on the relationship between firm size and Tobin's Q being negative was
questionable.

Table 4.9 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Step I
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)
Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors
Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

1.467

1.456

VIF
t-value
1.524

-0.148

-1.615

-2.234

1.350

0.068

0.796

0.082

0.964

0.047

0.510

1.252

0.081

0.874

0.089

0.960

0.086

0.914

1.309

-0.095

0.270

-0.071

-0.814

-0.043

-0.495

1.146

-0.045

-0.510

-0.039

-0.443

-0.025

-0.280

1. 157

-0.039

-0.460

-0.040

-0.476

-0.030

-0.346

1.088

-0.132

-1.483

-0.155t

-1.725

-0.151t

-1.688

1.185

-0.046

-0.505

-0.047

-0.519

-0.033

-0.364

1.205

0.138

1.583

-0.067

-0.299

7.499

0.023

0.982

1. 679

0.371

1.620

7.796

-1.675

2.059

Rate of change in board of directors,^
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental dynamism (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
En vironmental munificence
(interaction term)

-0.1751

-1.878

-0.213*

-0.197t

Model F-value

1.114

1.28

1.322

R-Square
Change in R-Square

0.061

0.078

0.107

0.017

0.029

D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q ,•,,'" N=I46, t< 10, *p<Q5; **p<.0\

1 . 942
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Referring back to the correlation table, the relationship between ROA at t+2 and firm size
was positive as expected (p=0A46, p<A0) but the relationship between Tobin's Q at t+2
and firm size was surprisingly negative (p=-0A89, p<.05). Furthermore, another
performance measure, total shareholder returns for one year was positively related to
Tobin's Q (p=0.457, p<.0l) and ROA (p=0A96, p<05) for the second period. This tells
us that for the first couple of years, the relationship between market based and accounting
based measures of young entrepreneurial firms was unusual and worthy of further
exploration. Although this situation is beyond the scope of this study, I suspect that the
situation is due to liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1969) of these young
entrepreneurial firms as they struggle to build healthy financial structures. Furthermore,
use of sales growth as a performance measure with different control and interaction
variables in the future may shed some light on this irregularity.
Once the rate of change in directors at t+2 was added to the model, no significant
relationship was observed between the independent and dependent variables (P=0.138,
p>A0). Not surprisingly, neither of these models were statistically significant (F=T.114,
p>A0 and F=l .280, p>. 10). This means the hypothesis regarding the impact of changes in
boards of directors as corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance is not
supported once Tobin's Q in the third year following the IPO is used as the performance
measure.
The analysis of firm performance does not end with just looking at market based
measures. We also need to use accounting based measures to assess firm performance.
Table 4.10 reports the results of such an assessment. Once again, control variables were
added in the first step.

Table 4.10 Regression Results (ROA)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

-1.319

-1.285
0.169*

2.018

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

0.199*

2.368

Nationality of the firm

-0.054

-0.657

-0.069

-0.849

Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)

-0.066

-0.751

-0.077

-0.884

VIF
t-value
-1.346

0.241**

2.851

1.260

-0.033

-0.397

1.230

-0.081

-0.931

1.339

0.174*

2.186

0.141f

1.754

0.114

1.423

Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors

0.010

0.120

0.005

0.066

-0.016

-0.194

1.154

0.003

0.034

0.004

0.047

-0.013

-0.164

1.161

Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

0.175*

2.096

0.202*

2.408

0.198*

2.398

1.202

0.075

0.859

0.075

0.872

0.057

0.665

1.282

-2.044

-0.009

-0.044

7.556

0.021

0.222

1.606

-0.374t

-1.757

7.956

0.255*

2.383

2.020

Rate of change in hoard of directors,^
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental dynamism (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in hoard directors X
Environmental munificence
(interaction term)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

-0.165*

2.093*

2.364*

2.401**

0 . 100

0 . 124

0.164

Dependent variable is "ROA ,«," N=160, t< 10. *p<Q5: **p<.0\

0.024*

0.040t
2.090

1. 136
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Among the control variables used in this model (firm size, nationality of the firm,
duality presence, founder chairman of the board, average age of directors, percentage of
directors with prior industry experience, nationality of the firm, directors with advanced
degrees and prior firm performance), as expected, firm size (P=0.169,/?<.05), presence of
directors with advanced degrees (P=0.175,/?<05) and prior firm performance using total
shareholder returns as a proxy (P=0.174,/?<.05) were related with the ROA of period t+3.
Moving on to the second step, where rate of change in boards of directors at t+2 was
introduced, the relationship between the focal independent variable (rate of change in
board of directors at t+2) and the dependent variable (ROA at t+3) was negative and
statistically significant (P=-0.165, p<.05). This means that the rate of change in boards of
directors at t+2 negatively impacts firm performance at t+3 when ROA was used as the
performance measure, unlike the non-significant relationship observed when Tobin's Q
was considered. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 6 and means that, based on
my sample, changes in one of the corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors,
are likely to result in lower performance in the third period. Further investigation of this
finding will be discussed in the next section.
To deepen the analysis of the relationship between firm performance measures
and the rate of change in boards of directors, other periods were also considered. As can
be seen in Tables 4.11 - 4.14, once the performance measures from the fourth period are
regressed against the rate of change in board of directors at t+3, no statistically significant
relationships were observed between the rate of change in boards of directors at t+3 and
Tobin's Q at t+4 (P=-0.123, p>A0) and ROA at t+4 (P=0.033, ;?>. 10). However, the
findings were surprising when the fourth period and fifth periods are considered.

Table 4.11 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Stepl
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)
Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors
Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

2.026

2.066
-0.239*

-2.453

-0.234*

0. 121

-2.412

VIF
t-value
1.725

-0.187t

-1.873

1.402

1.357

0.126

1.410

0.135

1.481

1.169

0.027

0.286

0.037

0.385

0.076

0.777

1.337

0.104

1. 170

0. 103

1.165

0.102

1.158

1.092

-0.103

-1.130

-0.108

-1.183

-0.105

- 1 . 144

1.187

-0.086

-0.970

-0.075

-0.851

-0.066

-0.738

1 . 124

0.055

0 . 610

0.054

0.651

0.086

0.935

1.200

-0.017

-0.180

-0.042

-0.438

-0.079

-0.810

1.319

-0.123

-1.417

-0.555

-1.298

25.632

-0.021

-0.150

2.751

0.095

0.279

16.355

0.398+

1.904

6.128

Rate of change in hoard of directors,+3
Rate of change in hoard directors X
Environmental
dynamism (interaction term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

1 . 614

1.670

1.606+

0.094

0.108

0.137

Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q l+4," N=I34, +< 10, *p<.05; **p<.0]

0.014

0.029
2 . 118

Table 4.12 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Step I
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)
Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors
Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

0. 623
-1.842

-0.229*

0.242*

2.628

0.254**

2.772

0.062

0.620

0.078

0.015

0. 165

-0.052

VIF
t-value
0.701

0.734

-0.1821

-2.235

1.338

0.251

2.690

1.092

0.787

0.070

0.692

1.284

-0.014

-0.146

-0.012

-0.127

1.126

-0.552

-0.082

-0.859

-0.083

-0.838

1.227

0.053

0.567

0.067

0.727

0.072

0.760

1.127

0.030

0.323

0.054

0.580

0.052

0.545

1.136

-0.022

-0.223

-0.023

-0.236

-0.023

-0.230

1.223

-0.1761

-1.802

-0.325

-1.360

7.151

0.050

0.329

2.905

0.099

0.430

6.623

0.041

0.372

1.547

Rate of change in board of directors,^
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
dynamism (interaction term)
Rate of change in hoard directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

-2.256

-0.231*

1.8331

2.023*

1.527

0.117

0.142

0.146

Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q l+5," N=I20, T< 10, *p<-05; **,e><.01

0.004

0.025t
2.225

Table 4.13 Regression Results (ROA)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)
Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors
Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

0.265**
-0.023
0.084
0.137+

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

-1.249

-1.226

VIF
t-value
-1.193
2.705

1.297

-0.275

-0.024

-0.282

-0.029

-0.323

1.220

-0.928

-0.088

-0.970

-0.100

-1.061

1.391

0.1424

1.708

1.081

3.044

1.676

0.263**

0.137+

2.013

1.674

0.246**

0.003

0.035

0.004

0.050

0.006

-0.067

1.152

-0.048

-0.562

-0.047

-0.548

-0.042

-0.471

1.216

0.139

1.631

0.140

1.638

0.134

1.528

1.209

0.128

1.416

0.136

1.472

0.146

1.554

1.387

0.038

-0.488

0.042

0.110

23.380

0.028

0.211

2 . 684

0.064

0.200

15.812

-0.096

-0.532

5.085

Rate of change in hoard of directors,+3
Rate of change in hoard directors X
Environmental
dynamism (interaction term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

2. 605*

2.330*

1.7681

0.130

0.132

0.136

Dependent variable is "ROA w , " N=148, t<IO: *p<.05: **p<.01

0.002

0.004
2.096

Table 4.14 Regression Results (ROA)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size
Nationality of the firm
Duality
Firm Performance (total shareholder
return)
Percentage of directors with prior
industry experience
Average age of directors
Presence of directors with advanced
graduate degrees
Founder Chairman

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

0.256
0.248**

2.703

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

0.563
0.186*

2.103

VIF
t-value
0.370

0.195*

2.201

1.220

-0.052

-0.577

-0.045

-0.521

-0.048

-0.561

1.162

0.040

0.412

0.070

0.761

0.061

0.658

1.320

0.074

0.840

0.021

0.253

0.025

0.295

1.105

-0.046

-0.515

-0.103

-1.205

-0.077

-0.884

1.175

-0.1571

-1.697

-0.139

-1.581

-0.126

-1.431

1.206

-0.038

-0.415

0.008

0.095

0.016

0.185

1.177

0.002

0.015

-0.020

-0.212

-0.026

-0.283

1.340

-0.326**

-3.772

-0.369

-1.601

8.248

0.163

1.213

2.802

-0.018

-0.080

7.680

-0.138

-1.481

1.350

Rate of change in board of dlrectorss+4
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
dynamism (interaction term)
Rate of change in hoard directors X
Environmental complexity (interaction
term)
Rate of change in board directors X
Environmental
munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value

2.277*

3.826**

3.199**

R-Square

0.131

0.223

0.247

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is "ROA «,"N=130, f< 10, *p<.05\ **p<.0\

0.092**

0.024
2 . 035

Q
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As mentioned on Table 4.12, once Tobin's Q from the fifth period is regressed
against the same control variables and the rate of change in boards of directors from the
fourth period, the relationship was negative and statistically significant (P=-0.176,p<.10).
This relationship becomes even stronger when the dependent variable is ROA for the
fifth period (P=-0.326,/K.01). An important point to note is, Tobin's Q and ROA values
reveal similar results as the years pass, which I believe is an indication of these young
entrepreneurial firms becoming more established in terms of both book and market
values.
In short, looking at the different results, one can observe that the changes in
boards of directors have a negative impact firm performance of young entrepreneurial
firms included in this study. This finding is in line with Hypotheses 6 and will be
explained further in the discussion section.
The second type of corporate governance mechanism, TMT members, is also
investigated using similar but different control variables and the same performance
measures. The results of this analysis are reported on Table 4.15. In this model, firm size,
nationality of the firm (dummy variable), presence of duality (dummy variable), total
shareholder returns (as a proxy for prior performance), percentage of executives with
industry experience, average age of executives, executives with advanced degrees
(dummy variable) and founder as the CEO (dummy variable) were used as control
variables, Tobin's Q at t+3 as the dependent variable and the number of new executive
appointees at t+2 as the independent variable. Neither the model with the control
variables nor the model with number of new executive appointees added was significant.

Table 4.15 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

2.074

2.191
-0.161t

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

VIF
t-value
2.021

-1.740

-0.137

-1.459

-0.127

-1.281

1.406

Nationality of the firm

0.081

0.930

0.077

0.886

0.072

0.792

1.188

Duality

0.071

0.753

0.087

0.908

0.092

0.947

1.352

-0.083

-0.959

-0.084

-0.973

-0.093

-1.047

1.120

-0.052

-0.588

-0.060

-0.683

-0.070

-0.746

1.246

-0.070

-0.789

-0.059

-0.661

-0.056

-0.625

1.156

-0.210*

-2.387

-0.181*

-1.997

-0.185*

-2.003

1.213

-0.515

-0.064

-0.683

-0.062

-0.655

1.285

-0.112

-1.257

-0.105

-0.524

5.708

0.046

0.430

1.623

-0.048

-0.426

1.804

0.000

0.002

5.574

Firm Performance (total shareholder return)
Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience
Average age of executives
Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees
Founder CEO

-0.048

Number of new executive appointees,^
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value

1.610

1.613

1.217

R-Square
Change in R-Square

0.089

0.100

0.102

0.011

0.002

D-W Statistic

2.014

Dependent variable is "Tobm's Q ,+•„" N=141, f< 10, *p<.05; **p<01
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The only two control variables that were found to be significantly related with
Tobin's Q at t+3 was the dummy variable that accounts for the presence of executives
with master's or higher degrees (P=-0.210, p<.05) and the firm size variable (P=-0.161,
p<. 10).This finding implies that companies with executives who do not have advanced
degrees are more likely to experience new appointees to their boards. Once the number of
new executive appointees was added to the model, the coefficient for the independent
variable became statistically non-significant (P=-0.112, p>A0). Hence, at least for the
third year after the IPO, there was no relationship present between the number of new
executive appointees and firm performance when Tobin's Q was considered as the
performance measure.
The findings were not different when ROA was used as the performance measure.
According to Table 4.16, among the control variables, ROA at t+3 was positively related
with prior firm performance (P=0.152,/K.10) and with the dummy variable that accounts
for the presence of executives with advanced degrees (P=0.185, p<.05). Once the main
effect was introduced in the model, there was no significant relationship observed
between the dependent and the independent variables (P=0.068, p>A0). This means that,
as far as the changes in one of the corporate governance mechanisms, TMT, was
concerned, these changes do not result in lower market based nor accounting based
performance during the third year following the IPO. When further analyses were
conducted by regressing firm performance at t+4 and t+5 against the number of new
executive appointments at t+3 and t+4, none of the performance measures proved to be
significantly related (The details of these analyses can be found in Table 4.17, 4.18, 4.19
and 4.20). In short, Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Table 4.16 Regression Results (ROA)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

-1.595
0.179*

2.092

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

1.886

t-value
-1.450

-1.480
0.1651

VTF

0.1581

1.722

1.349

Nationality of the firm

-0.053

-0.627

-0.055

-0.642

-0.050

-0.563

1.234

Duality

-0.067

-0.747

-0.077

-0.845

-0.081

-0.883

1.352

0.1591

1.915

1.092

Firm Performance (total shareholder return)
Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience
Average age of executives
Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees
Founder CEO

0.152+

1.881

0.1531

1.894

-0.006

-0.073

-0.002

-0.021

0.001

0.015

1.225

0.013

0.150

0.005

0.061

0.004

0.049

1.247

0.185*

2.205

0.1681

1.929

0. 173t

1.958

1.242

0.070

0.776

0.079

0.864

0.077

0.832

1.362

0.068

0.814

0.053

0.278

5.807

-0.024

-0.237

1. 621

0.060

0.575

1.756

-0.012

-0.064

5.604

Number of new executive appointees,+2
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value

2.077*

1.9161

1.441

R-Square

0 . 102

0.106

0.109

0.004

0.003

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

2.116

Dependent variable is "ROA , + ,,"N=155, f< 10, * p < 0 5 ; **/?<. 01
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Table 4.17 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

3.480
-0.217*

Nationality of the firm
Duality

-2.277

t-value
-2.064

t-value
3.584

3.668
-0.199*

VIF

-0.1721

-1.735

1.359

1.766

0.143

1.597

0.148

1. 619

1.157

-0.158

-0.019

-0.198

-0.006

-0.060

1.335

0.076

0.864

0.071

0.810

0.072

0.809

1.087

0.1581

-0.198*

-2.215

-0.200*

-2.234

-0.202*

-2.239

1.134

-0.1651

-1.856

-0.189

-2.079

-0.199*

-2.119

1.222

0.014

0.159

0.017

0.186

0.008

0.094

1.120

0.019

0.202

-0.001

-0.012

-0.015

-0.154

1.329

-0.113

-1.232

0. 126

-0.641

5.371

0.068

0.592

1.859

-0.082

-0.421

5.326

0.099

0.983

1.406

Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees
Founder CEO
Number of new executive appointees,^
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)
Model F-value
R-Square
Change in R-Square

D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q l+4." N=127, f< 10, *p<M:

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

-0.015

Firm Performance (total shareholder return)
Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience
Average age of executives

l-vaiue

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

2.689**

2.569*

2.067*

0 . 154

0.165

0.179

0.011

0.014
2.091

**p<0\

Table 4.18 Regression Results (Tobin's Q)
Stepl
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

0.760

1.505
-0.125

Nationality of the firm

0.308**

Duality

0.006

Firm Performance (total shareholder return)
Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience
Average age of executives

-1.267

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

-0.137

-1.394

VIF
t-value
0.335

-0.099

-1.013

1.257

3.393

0.532**

3.770

2 . 605

0.237

0.068

0 . 662

1.371

0.005

0.048

0.023

0.247

1.115

-0.254

-0.022

-0.230

-0.012

-0.122

1.163

-0.108

-1.137

-0.102

-1.080

-0.097

-1.027

1.162

0.084

0.875

0.098

1.030

0.086

0.923

1. 145

0.163

1.597

0.135

1.323

0 . 107

1.063

1.322

0.235

1.636

-0.024

-0.100

7.505

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)

-0.046

-0.272

3.797

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)

0.279

1.363

5.497

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)

0.306*

2.608

1.797

Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees
Founder CEO

3.244

0.482**

0.058

0.025

-0.014

-0.150

-0.024

Number of new executive appointees,^

Model F-value

2.485*

2.543*

R-Square

0.163

0.185

0.252

0.022

0.067*

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q ,+,," N=l 11, | < 10, *p<.05: **p<.01

2.749

2 .377

Table 4.19 Regression Results (ROA)
Step 1
Standardized
coefficient
Constant
Firm Size

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

-1.441
0.267**

2.273

1.296

-0.172

-0.181

1.248

-0.888

-0.085

-0.888

1.350

0.122

1.457

0. 123

1.444

1.063

-0.897

-0.078

-0.910

-0.077

-0.876

1.135

-0.268

-0.012

-0.134

-0.011

-0.112

1.355

0.117

1.349

0 . 116

1.329

0.117

1.323

1.151

0.099

1.035

0.107

1.107

0.108

1.096

1.420

0.049

0.564

0.037

0.193

5.447

-0.000

-0.001

1.856

0.020

0.102

5.434

-0.011

-0.115

1.400

0.259**

-0.021

-0.232

-0.015

Duality

-0.085

-0.909

-0.084

0.120

1.441

-0.077
-0.024

Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience
Average age of executives
Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees
Founder CEO
Number of new executive appointees,+3
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)
Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)

0.256**

Model F-value

2.286*

2.057*

1.511

R-Square

0.121

0.123

0.123

0.002

0.000

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic

t-value

-0.017

2.999

2.887

VIF

-1.487

-1.522

Nationality of the firm
Firm Performance (total shareholder return)

t-value

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

2.137

Dependent variable is "ROA l+4," N=142, | < 10. *p<.Q5\ **p<.0\
O

Table 4.20 Regression Results (ROA)
Stepl
Standardized
coefficient
Constant

t-value

Step 2
Standardized
coefficients

t-value
0.322

0.383

Firm Size

0.186t

Nationality of the firm

1.949

Step 3
Standardized
coefficients

1.931

0.1851

VIF
t-value
0.255

0.1951

1.952

1.225

-0.039

-0.403

-0.026

-0.180

-0.011

-0.074

2.773

Duality

0.061

0.591

0.062

0.596

0.067

0 . 624

1.410

Firm Performance (total shareholder return)

0.052

0.562

0.053

0.571

0.055

0.580

1.103

Percentage of executives with prior
industry experience

-0.031

-0.324

-0.031

-0.325

-0.027

-0.276

1.157

Average age of executives

-0.187t

-1.890

-0.187+

-1.881

-0.1931

-1.861

1.320

Presence of executives with advanced graduate
degrees

-0.060

-0.626

-0.059

-0.610

-0.062

-0.630

1.175

Founder CEO

-0.016

-0.151

-0.018

-0.168

-0.024

-0.221

1.470

0.017

0.121

0.014

0.055

7.713

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental dynamism (interaction term)

0.008

0.048

3.125

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental complexity (interaction term)

-0.012

-0.055

5.851

Number of new executive appointees X
Environmental munificence (interaction term)

0.046

0.383

1.774

Number of new executive

appointees,+4

Model F-value

1.542

1.360

R-Square

0.098

0.098

Change in R-Square
D-W Statistic
Dependent variable is "ROA ,+, "N=I23,+< 10. *p<.05; **/}<.01

0.000

1.014
0 . 100

•

0.002
2.010

Ill
The last set of hypotheses focused on the impact of environment on the
relationship

between

changes in corporate

governance mechanisms

and

firm

performance. Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 are about the moderating effects of environmental
dimensions on the relationship between changes in TMT membership and operating
performance, while hypotheses 10, 11, and 12 address the effect of environmental
dimensions on the relationship between changes in board composition and operational
performance. In order to test these hypotheses, the models constructed to test the main
effects were extended to include possible interaction effects.
First, please recall that, as mentioned in the methods section, the three dimensions
of environment chosen to be included in this study were environmental complexity,
environmental dynamism and environmental munificence (Dess and Beard, 1984). The
ways these three variables were operationalized are detailed in the method section. The
third column of Table 4.15 contains the interaction terms added to the regression model
where number of new executive appointees was the main effect. As can be seen, when
TMT change main effect is included in the model, the overall F value of this model was
not significant when Tobin's Q served as the dependent variable (F=l .217, /?>. 10). The
dynamism interaction term (P=0.046, p>A0), complexity interaction term (P=-0.048,
p>.10) and munificence interaction term (P=-0.000, p<A0) did not have statistically
significant relationships with firm performance when Tobin's Q at t+3 was the dependent
variable. The results do not change when ROA at t+3 is used as the dependent variable.
Once again, the overall model is not significant (F= 1.441, p>.10) and the results did not
reveal any relationships between the interaction terms and firm performance (P=-0.024,
p>A0 - P=0.060, p>.10 - P=-0.012, p>A0). These results tell us that, when number of
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new executives appointed on the board is the main effect (controlling for firm size,
nationality of the firm, presence of duality, prior firm performance, average age of
executives, executives with advanced graduate degrees, presence of founder as the CEO),
environmental complexity, dynamism and munificence do not exacerbate the relationship
between the changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance (at t+3).
Turning back to Table 4.9 which reports the results of the regression model which
includes Tobin's Q (t+3) as the dependent variable, the rate of change in boards of
directors as the main effect and dynamism, complexity and munificence as the interaction
terms (firm size, nationality of the firm, presence of duality, founder chairman, directors
with advanced graduate degrees, percentage of directors with prior industry experience
and prior firm performance as the control variables), the model with the interaction term
was not significant (F=1.322,p>.10). Among the individual beta coefficients, dynamism
(P=0.023, p>A0) and complexity (P=0.371, p>A0) were not related to the dependent
variable. However, the interaction term of munificence is negatively related with Tobin's
Q (p=-0.197, p<A0). Since the overall model was not significant, that finding is not
deterministic.
Table 4.10 contains the results of the regression model with ROA (t+3) and the
rate of change in boards of directors (t+2), the interactions terms and the above
mentioned control variables. The results of this model are more promising. First, there
was no statistically significant relationship observed for the moderating effect of
environmental dynamism on the relationship between rate of change in boards of
directors and firm performance (P=0.021, p>A0). However, as hypothesized, the
complexity interaction term was marginally and negatively significant (P=-0.374, p<A0)
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and the munificence interaction term was positively (P=0.255, p<.05) related to ROA
(M-3). According to these findings, the detrimental effect of interfering with one of the
corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors, on firm performance is
exacerbated by environmental complexity such that, under environmentally complex
situations, young entrepreneurial firms are in need of the original directors to cope up
with the external complexities. In other words, based on my sample, once the new owners
appoint their agents to the board of a young entrepreneurial firm, they should be aware
that, if the firm is facing environmental complexity, the new directors may not be able to
lead the firm in a positive direction.
The same logic also applies when the environment is munificent. Referring to the
third column of Table 4.10, I found a positive relationship between the munificence
interaction term and firm performance when ROA (/+3) was used as the performance
measure (P=0.255, p<.05). Hence, the more munificent the environment, the less
detrimental the effects of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm
performance. From a different perspective, more detrimental is the impact of the main
effect on the dependent variable when the environment is less munificent. In short,
Hypotheses 7, 8, 9 and 10 were not supported but Hypotheses 11 and 12 were supported.
The implications of all these findings will be discussed in the next chapter.
Table 4.21 summarizes the findings of this study. In short, several interesting
findings shed light on many of the unknowns of IPO and corporate governance research.
To recap, the results reveal that there is a positive relationship between the first day
return (underpricing) and rate of change in blockholder ownership during the first year
after the IPO.
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Table 4.21 Summary of Results
Hypotheses
HI: Young entrepreneurial firms experiencing significant underpricing will
attract potential investors who acquire blockholder ownership positions in the
focal firms.

Result

Supported

H2: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of
young entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in TMT
membership over the subsequent five-year period.

Not Supported

H3: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of
young entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in board
membership over the subsequent five-year period.

Supported

H4: Higher rates of change in board composition of young entrepreneurial
firms will be associated with a higher rate of change in TMT membership
over the subsequent five-year period.
H5: Higher rates of change in TMT membership of young entrepreneurial
firms will be associated with lower operating performance over the
subsequent five-year period.
H6: Higher rates of change in board membership of young entrepreneurial
firms will be associated with lower operating performance over the
subsequent five-year period.
H7: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such
that the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a
higher rate of change in TMT membership are on operating performance.

Not Supported

Not Supported

Partially Supported

Not Supported

H8: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity,
such that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects
of higher rates of change in the TMT membership on operating performance.
H9: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence,
such that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the
effects of a higher rate of change in the TMT membership will be on
operating performance.

Not Supported

H10: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such
that the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of
higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance.

Not Supported

Hit: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity,
such that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects
of higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance.
H12: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence,
such that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the
effects of higher rates of change in board composition on operating
performance.

Not Supported

Supported

Supported
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In addition, the rate of change in blockholder ownership results in a higher rate of
change in boards of directors during the second year but does not affect the number of
new executive appointees for the same period. More importantly, the results show that
higher rates of change in boards of directors have a detrimental effect on firm
performance when an accounting based measure is used as the performance indicator. I
was not able to replicate those results when a market-based measure was used as the
performance measure. The higher number of new executive appointees was not related to
firm performance. Finally, environmental complexity and munificence were shown to
moderate the relationship between the changes in boards of directors and firm
performance but not on the relationship between changes in TMT and firm performance.
In the next section, I will be discussing the implications of all of these findings.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
Research Findings
My purpose in this study was to build several models for explaining the
relationships between IPO underpricing, changes in ownership, changes in corporate
governance mechanisms of young entrepreneurial firms and its impact on subsequent
performance. I also investigated whether the external environment may impact such
relationships. Based on the contentions of the signaling model (Leland &Pyle, 1977),
Hypothesis 1 proposed that firms with higher returns on the first day, which means "the
original owners have just left money on the table" (Ritter, 1991), were initially
underpriced, and will experience changes in blockholder ownership after the IPO. Once
some of the original blockholders are replaced with new ones, based on the general
tendency of principals looking after their interests through appointment of their own
agents (Daily et al., 2003), hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that there will be subsequent
changes observed in corporate governance mechanisms such as a higher rate of change in
TMT membership (Hypothesis 2) and the board of directors (Hypothesis 3). In
Hypothesis 4, I also proposed that the changes in TMT membership may also result from
changes in the board of directors.
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After these proposed changes in corporate governance mechanisms, based on the
need for original directors and executives to continue with the previously successful
entrepreneurial activities and not to diminish the entrepreneurial efficacy, hypotheses 5
and 6 proposed lower operating performance resulting from changes in corporate
governance mechanisms. In the final sets of hypotheses (7-12) I also proposed that three
dimensions of external environment, dynamism, complexity and munificence, as
mentioned by Dess and Beard (1984) will exacerbate the negative relationship between
the changes in corporate governance mechanism and operating performances of young
entrepreneurial firms.
Looking at the results, I observed a positive relationship between first day returns
and changes in blockholder ownership during the first year following the IPO. This
finding was supported with not only regression analysis but also with an ANOVA that
looked at the differences in underpricing for the firms that experience ownership change
within the first year after the IPO time and for those that did not. These results show that
subsequent blockholders assess the IPO performance of young entrepreneurial firms. The
theoretical implications of these changes will be discussed in the following pages. In
addition, the results also showed a positive association between rate of change in
blockholder ownership and follow-up changes in board of directors. While the same
situation did not apply to number of new executives, as I already mentioned, the way the
variable is operationalized may be the reason behind that lack of significance. The
significant relationship between the changes in board of directors and changes in
blockholder ownership demonstrate that new owners are willing to appoint their own
agents to look after their interests.
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The next set of hypotheses was about the impact of changes in corporate
governance mechanisms on firm performance. The results showed that when market
based measures are used, the governance changes do not result in lower performance.
However, when accounting based measures are used, I was able to show that the changes
in boards of directors resulted in lower operating performance while the same was not the
case for the relationship between the number of new executives and subsequent
performance. This lack of significance is meaningful within the context of the general
theme of this study as I originally proposed that these relationships are interrelated. In
other words, since the changes in blockholder ownership did not result in a higher
number of new executive appointments, the results did not reveal an impact of that
variable on subsequent operating performance. On the other hand, blockholder ownership
positively affected the rate of change in boards of directors, which resulted in subsequent
negative impact on firm performance. This is in parallel to the general theme of this
study. This finding shows that if the new owners of young entrepreneurial firms decide to
interfere with the entrepreneurial efficacy of these firms by appointing new directors to
the board, there is a negative impact on operating performance that is immediately
observed after those changes. The managerial and theoretical impactions of that will be
discussed further in the following pages.
Finally, the results also demonstrated that the negative relationship between
changes in the boards of directors and operating performance is exacerbated by
environmental

complexity

and munificence.

Under complex conditions, young

entrepreneurial firms are still in need of the expertise and social capital provided by their
original directors. In addition, if the environment is not munificent enough, these firms,
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once again are in need of the experience, expertise and knowledge of their directors to
cope with external conditions. The lack of significance of these potential moderator
variables on the relationship between number of new executive appointments and
operating performance once again makes intuitive sense. Since the results did not show
any relationship between new executive appointments and firm performance, it is not
surprising to observe a lack of relationship.
In short, these results show support for the general theme of this study and also
for some of the individual hypotheses. I now turn to discuss the theoretical and
managerial implications of these findings. This chapter will also explain the limitations
and potential future extensions of this study and provide conclusions.

Theoretical Implications
Several theoretical implications of the findings of this study are worthy of
mentioning. Recalling the propositions of signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Welch,
1989; Allen & Faulhaber, 1989), underpricing is considered to be a signal about a firm's
future. Research also suggests that investors are more likely to purchase blocks of stock
in publicly traded companies when they perceive expected benefits to exceed expected
costs (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Bethel et al., 1998). Based on the data I collected, I
managed to demonstrate that young entrepreneurial firms with higher first day returns are
likely to experience higher rates of change in blockholder ownership. This is in line with
the basic contentions of the above-mentioned researchers. Recall from Chapter 3 that the
rate of change variable is calculated based on the original owners being replaced by the
new owners rather than the new owners gathering shares in the company while the
original owners are still in place. This way of operationalizing the variable is unique and
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makes theoretical sense. I proposed that young entrepreneurial firms, due their unique
nature, are in need of inputs, knowledge, expertise and experience provided by their
original owners that brought the company to the IPO stage. If they are still in place, they
will continue to provide these resources. If new blockholders replace them, this process
becomes more difficult. I believe finding a relationship between rates of change in
blockholder ownership and underpricing is meaningful from that perspective.
The findings become even more meaningful when I turn to the relationship
between rate of change in blockholder ownership and the rate of change in board
membership. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there seems to be a positive
relationship between the two. Beaty and Zajac (1994) contend that large equity holders
will be keen for monitoring practices so they are more likely to be active in appointment
decisions. Thus, new blockholders that replace the original ones, also decide to replace
some of the original directors with their own appointees. In other words, once the new
blockholders possess controlling power in young entrepreneurial firms, they are prone to
interfere with the structure of the board of directors. I believe that such a finding is
important for not only the IPO literature but also for the shareholder activism concept of
corporate governance research. More importantly, these results demonstrate that in young
entrepreneurial firms new blockholders are more interested in board composition than the
top management team. For that reason, I was unable to demonstrate a significant
relationship between new executive appointees and changes in ownership structure. As I
mentioned before, while the lack of a statistically significant relationship may be due to
the way the change in TMT variable was operationalized, new owners appear less
interested in TMT composition than board composition. This means that, as members of
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the dominant coalition, boards of directors receive more attention from active
shareholders. New executive appointees do not seem to be a result of new directors
either. This situation, once again, supports my explanation of more interest being paid to
boards of directors rather than executives.
One of the motivators of this study was to demonstrate the detrimental effects of
the transformations in young entrepreneurial firms during the post IPO period on
operating performance. Kroll et al. (2007) recommended that the original executives of
young entrepreneurial firms are needed for better post-IPO performance. In a previous
study, Kor (2003) proposed that both sets of members of the dominant coalition are
needed for success in IPO firms as the expertise and experience provided by the original
members of the TMT and board of directors are sources of competitive advantage for
such unique business entities. The results of this study show that, when accounting based
measures are considered, interfering with the board of directors of the firms included in
the analyses results in lower operating performance. I was not able to demonstrate that to
be the case for executives though. This is not surprising as the replacement of these
executives was not a result of new owners. I expected to observe a relationship between
IPO performance and the rate of change in blockholder ownership during the first year
following the IPO and then higher rates of changes in boards of directors and TMTs.
Since the owners did not interfere with the TMTs of the firms included in this study, the
changes in TMT did not result in lower operating performance. On the other hand, the
extensive amount of attention paid to boards of directors and interference with the boards
through replacement of original directors with new ones resulted in lower accountingbased operating performance. Although agency theorists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) are
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interested in presence of board vigilance for better firm performance, this may not be that
crucial in the case of young entrepreneurial firms. Walters et al. (2010) mentioned that
the agency problems are less acute in younger and smaller firms. Fama and Jensen (1983)
recommended that in smaller firms, for better performance, strategic decision-making
should be retained by the same individuals. The findings of this study support the
propositions of those authors.
The difference in results between the market-based and accounting-based
performance measures should also be discussed. My expectation was that different
performance measures would reveal similar results and be positively related with each
other. That was not the case with my data. King and Santor (2008) offer a good
explanation for this contradiction. In their study, the authors observed that the
organizational performances of the companies in their sample looked much better when
ROA values are considered versus when Tobin's Q values are used as performance
measures. A majority of the companies in their sample were family-owned businesses.
Considering my sample was composed of young entrepreneurial firms, their explanation
of this inconsistency in performance measures is applicable to the present study. "Family
owned firms have higher profitability, but that future expected cash-flows are discounted
more heavily by investors due to threat of expropriation by controlling shareholders"
(King and Santor, 2008:2429). This is probably why I observed a strong negative
correlation between accounting-based and market-based measures. Furthermore, this is
also probably why as these young entrepreneurial firms become more established and the
market players get to know them, their accounting-based and market-based performance
measures start to reveal similar results. Ibbotson (1975) mention that underwriters should
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"leave a good taste in investor's mouth" as the risk associated with them is more
extensive. In fact, that is why younger firms experience more underpricing (Jain, 1994).
It turns out that for the first couple of years following an IPO, young entrepreneurial
firms are still considered to be risky by investors which are reflected in lower-market
based measures. While some of these companies do really well, it takes some time for
investors to gain confidence in them. The uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms
(Kroll et al., 2007) and the need for adopting different mechanisms in their governance
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) were previously mentioned. The difference between
the performance measures also means that researchers should be cautious about the way
they measure the performances of these types of firms. In addition to the major findings
of this study, I believe the inconsistency observed between performance measures is also
important and needs further attention in future studies.
The results also showed the moderating effects of some of the environmental
variables. Recalling the work of Fredrickson (1984) concerning the need for companies
to match their internal structure and processes with external environments, and the work
of other researchers (McAurthur & Nystrom; Boyd, 1995; Goll & Rasheed, 1997) that
highlighted the need to account for environment when making strategic decisions, I
believe it is not surprising to observe two of the dimensions of environment exacerbate
the relationship between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm
performance. In the case of young entrepreneurial firms, the results revealed that the need
for original directors to provide their tacit knowledge (Kor, 2003) becomes even more
critical

given

greater environmental

complexity and less munificence.

Young

entrepreneurial firms are in need of internal mechanisms to deal with the external
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environment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Walters & Buhian, 2004). Furthermore, the
reason for not observing a moderating effect for environmental dynamism may be
explained by the famous "liability of newness" contention of Stinchcombe (1965). Based
on these results, I suspect that these younger firms are already operating in dynamic
conditions due this liability of newness thus the lack of impact by environmental
dynamism is understandable. On the other hand, environmental complexity and
munificence dimensions of Dess and Beard (1984) do play a role and should be taken
into account for the strategic decision making process.

Implications for Management Practice
Several implications for management practice emerge from this study. First, postIPO shareholders of young entrepreneurial firms should be aware of the fact that if they
interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms of these firms, their performance
tends to suffer. Second, the impact on performance flows through the board of directors
rather than the TMT. Thus, executives of these firms should expect to see new
appointments on board of directors right after new owners secure controlling shares.
Third, the results show that boards are more important than they used to be. In today's
economy, board members are more active and should be given greater scrutiny as they
are now strategic decision makers rather than simple monitors of executive actions.
Fourth, strategic decision makers of young entrepreneurial firms should understand that
at this stage the market pays for growth rather than operating efficiency. In other words,
no matter how successful they are based on accounting measures, it takes some time for
the market to recognize that success. They are also seen as highly risky and because of
that risk, they should expect to leave some money on the table during the IPO process.
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Furthermore, young entrepreneurial firms are in need of the tacit knowledge provided by
their original members of the dominant coalition if they want to maintain the
entrepreneurial efficacy that brought them this far. Finally, the results show that young
entrepreneurial firms, due to their size and liability of newness, are more volatile against
the external environment. These firms should be aware that the need for retaining the
original directors is even stronger when the external environment is dynamic and less
munificent.

Future Research, Limitations, Conclusion
There are several possible future extensions of this study. For instance, the IPO
stage of these firms should be investigated more thoroughly. While I managed to
demonstrate the indirect effect of IPO performance on subsequent operating performance
through changes in ownership and corporate governance mechanisms, I believe the story
does not end there. What else triggers changes in ownership structure other than
underpricing? What else triggers changes in corporate governance mechanisms other than
the changes in ownership structure? Furthermore, researchers may adopt different ways
of operationalizing certain variables. For example, rather than using new executive
appointments as I did in this study, future researchers may prefer a different variable.
Also, several other performance variables such as market return and return on equity can
be introduced in future models. If possible, use of survey data from the strategic decision
makers of young entrepreneurial firms may be insightful in understanding the decisionmaking routines in these companies.
Recalling the descriptive statistics mentioned in Chapter 4, the future researchers
should also be looking into the potential importance of three variables in IPO literature.
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These variables are: education structures of executives and directors, the presence of
mergers and acquisitions among IPO firms, and the importance of venture capitalists on
ownership structure. Among these variables, venture capitalists are probably the one that
received the highest amount of attention. Previous studies demonstrated that venture
capitalist presence is associated with lower IPO returns (Meggison & Weiss, 1991) and
serve as a signaling mechanism for publicly traded firms (Sanders & Boivie, 2004).
However, to my knowledge, their impact on subsequent changes in ownership structure
was not thoroughly investigated. Such an investigation will not only serve the IPO
literature but also the corporate governance literature. In addition, previous researchers
were interested in the impact of education in firm governance (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).
These authors were able to demonstrate that education is a determinant factor in firm
innovation capabilities. Yet, to my knowledge, the importance of education in the case of
young entrepreneurial firms is not clear. In future extensions of this study, that may be
another variable to consider. Finally, as mentioned in the results section, a significant
portion of the companies in my sample were acquired by or merged with other
companies. Some of them were also delisted either voluntary or involuntarily due to
bankruptcy. These happenings are certainly of interest to the researchers of
entrepreneurship and corporate governance literatures. The answers to questions such as
"what type of young entrepreneurial firms involve in acquisitions or mergers" and "why
some young IPO firms go bankrupt so quickly?" will shed light to some of the unknowns
of both streams of research.
Like any other study, this study has limitations. I tried to construct a large
database, but the sample size in my study is limited. I used a five-year period for my
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study although the sample size would have been much higher if a ten-year period was
considered. Rather than using the 2001-2005 period, the sample size could have been
larger if I had used 1996-2005 period. In future extensions of this study, my plan is to
collect data for extended periods. Due to the sample size, my models did not have high
statistical power. If I can manage to increase the sample size in the future extensions of
this study this limitation will be eliminated. I did not include financial sector or energy
sector companies in this study. Future researchers may choose to investigate the behavior
of these specific industries apart from the industries included in my study.
In this study, my purpose was to contribute to the corporate governance, strategic
management and entrepreneurship literatures and provide some insights for practitioners
about young entrepreneurial firms. The results showed that the traditional approach
adopted by shareholders to appoint their agents is not applicable in the case of these types
of firms. It is natural for market players to gather controlling shares in promising firms.
Yet, new shareholders should have confidence in the original strategic decision makers
rather than having previously known parties to look after their interests. Investing in
young and smaller firms is by itself risky, these investors should not make the situation
more complicated by interfering with the corporate governance mechanisms of these
firms. After all, my results showed that this interference is detrimental for firm
performance, which is probably the last thing they would want to happen.
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